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DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A MODEL OF FALLOUT SHELTER STAY --ETC(U)


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# DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A MODEL OF FALLOUT SHELTER STAY TIMES

The BDM Corporation 7915 Jones Branch Drive McLean, Virginia 22102

29 December 1978

Final Report for Period 15 June 1978-29 December 1978

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-78-C-0060

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The Attrition Rate Model is a model of how and at what rate individuals leave fallout shelters. This document is a description of the model and the methodology used to develop it. In addition, this document serves as a user's guide to the application of the model. Two complete examples are presented-a pencil-and-paper study of fallout casualties in a representative Soviet city, and an application to a red-on-blue SIDAC scenario. The complete programs necessary to run the SIDAC post-processor are also included.

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#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### THE PROBLEM

During the exercise of strategic simulations and models for the estimation of the total number of injuries and fatalities following a nuclear exchange, a number of critical parameters must be employed whose exact values are unknown, yet whose impact on simulated results is considerable. One such parameter is the assumed fallout shelter 'stay time' of the civilian population.

One standard currently employed in the strategic simulation community is the set of effective protection factors developed by SRI (4), based on the following stay time assumptions:

- (1) 7 days fully sheltered followed by 14 days partially sheltered for shelters exhibiting adequate plumbing/water facilities, and
- (2) 2 days fully sheltered followed by 3 days of partial sheltering for facilities exhibiting generally inadequate plumbing/water facilities.

These protection factors are incorporated, for example, by the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) in the Single Integrated Damage Assessment Capability (SIDAC) for the estimation of fallout fatalities and injuries in various strategic scenarios. However, the shelter stay times reflected in these parameters represent little more than best reasonable estimates of shelter stay. The use of these and other 'reasonable' assumptions of stay generate a wide variation in the number of simulated fallout casualties.

As a result, a definite need exists for the development of a methodology to justify choice of stay time assumption and to reduce the variability associated with the human factor in large scale simulations.

#### **OBJECTIVE**

The objective of this study is threefold:

(1) First, to develop a model of fallout shelter stay time based on the application of principles of human behavior to an empirical database;

- (2) Second, to provide a guide for, and examples of, the use of this model for the strategic analyst specifically involved in the simulation of fallout casualties in strategic exchanges; and
- (3) Third, to reduce the wide variation in simulated strategic casualties currently displayed as a result of the spectrum of stay times employed.

APPROACH--DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL

The model of fallout shelter stay developed in this study, denoted the Attrition Rate Model, is based on a statistical analysis of a quantitative database of human response in disaster situations. Behavioral studies of human response to disasters were systematically surveyed for quantative estimates of time spent in shelters and qualitative data bearing on the behavioral profile of shelterees. Three thousand estimates were derived from approximately seven hundred studies. Eight general categories of data were identified:

- (1) physiological,
- (2) shelter space,
- (3) shelter type,
- (4) warning,
- (5) training,
- (6) shelter management,
- (7) evacuation posture, and
- (8) communication.

For each of these categories, estimates of percent shelteree attrition were derived as a function of time since sheltering. Results were refined by eliminating data from incidents not analogous to a nost-attack environment. Qualitative behavior profiles derived from questionnaires, interviews and observations were developed and used to interpret the quantitative data.

The resulting model expresses, for a variety of shelter environments, the percent of shelterees leaving the shelter as a function of time since sheltering. It was found that, in contrast with traditional assumptions which assume entire population either completely in or out of

shelters at any given time, that the expected behavior response of a sheltered population is one of constant 'attrition' from the shelter.

UTILITY--A GUIDE TO THE MODEL'S USE

The utility of the Attrition Rate Model of fallout shelter stay is based on two features of the model:

- (1) First, that it provides a justification for choice of stay time assumption in strategic simulations by virtue of its basis in a quantitative database, and
- (2) Second, that it provides the potential for the reduction in the wide variation of simulated fallout casualties associated with the range of stay time assumptions traditionally employed.

In order to allow the strategic analyst to incorporate these advantages into current estimates of fallout casualties, and to derive full advantage from the Attrition Rate Model in strategic simulations, a guide to the use of the model in both pencil-and-paper and large scale simulations is developed and presented. The guide focuses on both the generic step-by-step procedure for the estimation of fallout casualties, and is illustrated by two explicit applications: a study of casualties in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, and an investigation of casualties associated with a SIDAC scenario.

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#### **PREFACE**

This report is submitted to the Defense Nuclear Agency by the BDM Corporation under Contract Number DNA-001-78-C-0060 and represents work conducted during the period 1 June 1978 through 1 January 1979.

The objective of this study is to develop a model of fallout shelter stay times and to provide a guide for its application in strategic simulations. The model, denoted the Attrition Rate Model, is based on an empirical database constructed from a systematic review of behavioral response in American disasters. Traditionally, stay time assumptions employed in strategic simulations have been based on little or no quantitative data, but have represented only reasonable or computationally convenient assumptions. The use of an empirical database in the Attrition Rate Model provides a justification for the choice of simulation stay time, and thus contributes to reducing the wide variation in simulation results characteristically associated with the 'human element'.

The utility of the Attrition Rate Model can be measured only by its usefulness and applicability within the strategic simulation community. For this reason, the material in this report is presented in a concise manner, specifically focused toward providing the strategic analyst with a guide for its use in simple 'pencil and paper' studies and large scale simulations, such as the Single Integrated Damage Assessment Capability (SIDAC).

The principal authors of this report are J. H. Kinrich, N. J. Maresea, and R. A. Levit.

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#### SECTION 1

#### INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

#### 1.1 BACKGROUND

One key element involved in the overall determination of the effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces is the use of strategic exchange simulations and targeting models. Among these simulations are the Single Integrated Damage Analysis Capability (SIDAC), which is a large scale nuclear exchange computer simulation, and CIVIC, COBRA, READY, and RISK II (1, 8). These tools allow strategists to investigate different scenarios characterized by variations in the distribution, type, yield, and accuracy of strategic weapons; alternate mission types (counterforce, counter-value, etc.); differing target vulnerabilities; and other strategic issues. The resulting number of fatalities and injuries sustained by the population through simulated prompt, collateral, and fallout effects contributes directly to estimates of a country's ability to recover; a process of significant strategic importance to any nation. However, during the exercise of these simulation tools for the determination of population attrition, a number of critical parameters must be employed whose exact values are unknown, yet whose impact on simulation results is considerable. One such parameter is the length of time the civilian population can be expected to remain in fallout shelters following a nuclear attack.

Currently, the Defense Nuclear Agency and others employ fallout protection factors developed by SRI (4). These standard PFs are heavily dependent on the shelter stay time assumptions used to generate them. SRI uses two sheltering assumptions in its study; these have been called the "Seven Day" and "Two Day" assumptions. For example, developed countries are assumed to have shelters with sufficient food, water, and plumbing facilities to allow a seven day stay in the shelter. This seven day period is followed by fourteen days of partial shelter occupancy: 2/3 of the day in the shelter, and 1/3 of the day outside. Lesser developed countries do

not have as highly developed water and plumbing systems. Therefore, shelters in these countries are assumed to allow two days of complete sheltering, followed by three days of partial (2/3 in, 1/3 out) sheltering.

In order to provide information on the extremes of shelter stay, some modelers also investigate two additional possibilities: Indefinite sheltering (100% sheltering until radiation level reaches zero) and no sheltering.

These variations in currently employed stay time assumptions support a wide variation in resulting population fatalities, yet each assumption represents little more than a "reasonable" estimate or computational simplification of shelter stay. To date the user has no empirical basis by which to choose a fallout shelter stay time. A definite need exists for the development of a methodology to justify the choice of stay time assumptions and to reduce the variability associated with the human factor in large scale simulations.

Determination of fallout shelter stay time involves the evaluation of human behavior under stressful situations. As such, a behavioral science approach to stay time estimation will provide the needed human factors element. This study represents an initial effort to address these needs in a quantitative manner.

#### 1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study is threefold:

- (1) First, to develop a model of fallout shelter stay times based on the applications principles of human behavior to an empirical database
- (2) Second, to provide a guide for the use of this model as a tool in casualty investigation, and;
- (3) Third, to reduce the wide variation in simulated strategic casualties currently displayed as a result of the spectrum of stay time assumptions employed.

In support of these objectives, a model of fallout shelter stay times, denoted the Attrition Rate Model, is constructed based on a compliation and anlaysis of quantitative stay time estimates from behavioral studies of disasters.

This document is a guide to the modeling methodology and applications of the model itself. Instruction in the use of the model in both "pencil-and-paper" and large scale computer simulation studies is provided with an example application for each type of study. These examples illustrate the reduction in the variability of fallout casualties, while the model itself provides a justification for the choice of stay time assumptions.

#### 1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION

The remainder of this report is composed of three sections. In Section 2, the methodology employed in the development of the Attrition Rate Model is presented along with a discussion of model extensions and limitations. A guide for the use of the model as a tool in casualty investigation and examples of its use are given in Section 3. These examples comprise first; an exemplary pepcil-and-paper study of casualties associated with a simulated laydown on the city of Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, and second; a computer simulated investigation of casualties based on a SIDAC red-on-blue simulation. Finally, Chapter IV discusses additional applications and extensions of the model.

# SECTION 2 A MODEL OF FALLOUT SHELTER STAY TIMES

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to develop a quantitative model of fallout shelter stay times in a nuclear environment, an empirical database must be developed which reflects as closely as possible the expected circumstances following a nuclear exchange. From the perspective of the sheltered population, this environment is characterized by the shelter atmosphere and the existence and/or perception of a real external threat.

The only peacetime experience available which provides quantitative data on shelter stay times in real threat environments is that of disaster studies. Indeed, a fundamental assumption of the present study is that a post-attack environment is a disaster, and that human response to a nuclear disaster is an extropolation of human response to natural disasters. Consequently, the model of fallout shelter stay time proposed in this study represents a quantitative summary of stay times based on an extensive disaster database characteristic of the American population. Because this database is derived from a spectrum of disaster shelter types, and includes behavioral response to real threats, it is felt to closely reflect the key behavioral determinants expected in a post-attack nuclear environment.

The development of this model, denoted the Attrition Rate Model, by the use of a quantitative empirical database provides a justification for its use as the "stay time assumption" in strategic simulations. Currently employed stay time assumptions are based on little or no data, but represent at best only reasonable approximations, and at worst, computationally convenient parameters. As such, there is no specific criteria by which to choose among assumptions, yet simulation results are quite sensitive to the assumptions employed. Thus, the Attrition Rate Model provides

a distinct advantage to the strategic analyst by providing a more justifiable choice of stay time, and consequently a reduction in the variation in simulation results traditionally associated with the 'human element'.

#### 2.2 OVERVIEW OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT

The approach employed in developing the Attrition Rate Model of fallout shelter stay times involved the construction of a quantitative database of stay time estimates extracted from relevant behavioral studies, and an analysis of the data for application to a post-attack environment. The resulting 'model' is cast in the form of graphical displays (with associated analytical representations) illustrating the percent of the shelter ed population expected to exit the fallout shelters as a function of time during the first ten days following shelter entrance.

Approximately seven hundred studies of human response to disaster, isolation and confinement, and shelter occupancy were reviewed, from which about three thousand estimates of stay time were extracted. These data were reduced to five hundred and seventy six points by eliminating of data from incidents not analogous to a post-attack environment. Within this final database, a frequency analysis was performed to identify general catagories of data which characterized reported motivations of shelter exit. These included physiological, shelter type, shelter space, warning, training, management, evacuation posture, and communication. shelter characteristic of each of these parameters were least-squares-fitted to linear, and in some cases simple power law, response curves. Qualitative behavior profiles derived from questionnaries, interviews, and observations were also developed, and used to interpret these quantitative data. Figure 2-1 illustrates the overall approach employed.

By combining data representing stay time estimates reflecting the best configurations of each of the above categories and data representing worst configurations, 'best case' and 'worst case' extremes in expected shelter exit response were developed. In this form, the model represents a useful tool for the investigation of the expected variation in fallout casualties due to the range of expected human response.




Figure 2-1. Development of the attrition rate model of fallout shelter stay times.

#### 2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL

#### 2.3.1 The Database

The source literature reviewed for the development of the Attrition Rate Model included approximately seven hundred studies of disaster, isolation and confinement, and fallout shelter occupancy. The overwhelming majority of the quantitative data subsequently employed in the model database was based on disaster studies of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (Disaster Research Group), the National Opinion Research Council, and the Ohio State Disaster Research Team (2,9,10,11). Table 2-1 depicts the nature of the disaster research reports included in the study. A decision was made not to include results of fallout shelter occupancy and isolation/confinement studies since the component of behavior reflecting the presence of a real external threat, as would be characteristic of a nuclear environment, was absent from these studies.

From the disaster studies, quantitative estimates of shelter stay times were identified and added to the database. For this purpose, the act of 'sheltering' was considered to be any overt behavior whose objective was to partially or completely protect the individual from the physical effects of an incident. Thus, in the case of a flood, for example, the 'shelter' may have been a rooftop, or in the case of an earthquake, under a table in the basement. Actual stay time data represent first hand reports via questionnaires and interviews with study participants or disaster victims, as well as observations reported by reliable observers such as the Red Cross, police, fire rescue, and other personnel involved in disaster recovery.

Stay data extracted from these studies were recorded by including event type and description, shelter type, stay time, reason for leaving, and time of arrival of aid. All data were coded and placed on computer cards for subsequent processing. As a check on internal consistency, the source documentation was divided in two, and data were extracted from each half by different analysts. The resulting response curves based on these two sets of data were found to correlate closely.

Table 2-1. Sources of disaster studies.

# BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF FALLOUT SHELTER STAY

# SOURCES DISASTER RESEARCH

DISASTER AGENTS	EVENTS STUDIED	FIELD STUDIES	INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES	REPORTS
AIRPLANES	4	3	176	7
BLIZZARDS	3	2	19	2
EARTHQUAKES, ETC.	8	8	1,831	10
EPIDEMICS AND EPIDEMIC THREATS	5	5	2,487	7
EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES	13	13	678	11
FALSE ALERTS	6	7	2,953	7
FLOODS	12	16	3,319	27
HURRICANES AND TYPHOONS	12	9	364	9
MINE DISASTERS	2	3	297	5
TORNADOES	20	31	2,092	34
TOXICOLOGICAL SUBSTANCES	8	8	227	6
WORLD WAR II BOMBINGS	4	6	7,163	4
MISCELLANEOUS	6	3	18	4_
TOTALS	103	114	21,624	121

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The initial three thousand point database developed in this manner represented a summary of quantitative stay time estimates and event characteristics from reliable observers, and provided a foundation for the development of the Attrition Rate Model.

#### 2.3,2 Data Analysis

In order to obtain a database most representative of a post-attack environment, a number of criteria were imposed by which to eliminate inappropriate data from the initial database. These criteria demanded that the data represent:


- (1) incidents characterized by brief, intense expenditure of energy;
- (2) stay time estimates before the arrival of aid;
- (3) data collected within 30 days of the incident; and,
- (4) data collected within impact and fringe areas.


The application of these criteria reduced the database from three thousand to approximately six hundred data points.


Within this final database, a frequency analysis was employed to identify categories of data associated with shelter exit. Eight such categories were identified:

1) physiological, 2) shelter space, 3) shelter type, 4) warning, 5) training, 6) shelter management, 7) evacuation posture, and 3) communication. The data were partitioned among these categories, and a least-squares linear fit was performed to develop response curves for each category. The resulting curves are shown in Figure 2-2. Note that in some cases, it was possible to fit the data to a simple power law more accurately than to a straight line.

For the purpose of employing these results in the investigation of fallout casualties, two additional cases were developed: Best Case, and Worst Case. For the Best Case response, all data representative of the best cases of each of the above eight categories were included. These data were then fit to a straight line, as shown in Figure 2-3a. Thus, this result summarizes the expected responses reflecting adequate food, water














Figure 2-2. Graphs of the general attrition rate equations.






















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






Figure 2-2. Graphs of the general attrition rate equations (continued).






**Time Since Sheltering (Hours)** 







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






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Figure 2-2. Graphs of the general attrition rate equations (continued).








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
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Figure 2-3. Graphs of the attrition rate equations - Best and Worst cases



and shelter space, and the presence of warned, trained, and well managed shelterees with adequate communication. The Worst Case is depicted in Figure 2-3b.

To complement the quantitative stay time data employed in construction of the Attrition Rate Model, qualitative behavior profiles and motivations for shelter exit as a function of time were also derived from the literature surveyed. These are summarized in Table 2-2 for the first seven days following the attack Generally, post attack behavior falls in the range considered normal. As shown in the table, reasons for shelter exit include: physical and physiological effects, such as shelter damage and lack of food, water, plumbing, etc.; lack of communication and direction; concern for relatives and friends; boredom; the desire to explore the external environment; the perception of the danger being over; and the need for action.

#### 2.4 DISCUSSION

The Attrition Rate Model, as denoted in this study, is the response depicted in Figure 2-2. Based on the systematic review of behavioral science source literature and the development of a database of quantitative stay time estimates, the model indicates that the expected behavioral response of a sheltered population is one of constant "attrition" from the shelter environment. This is to be contrasted with traditional assumptions in which the population is taken to be either completely in or completely out of their protective shelters at any one time.

Because of its foundation in a quantitative, empirical database, the Attrition Rate Model lends more justification to its use as a fallout shelter stay time assumption then do currently employed assumptions which vary widely in their definition, and which represent merely reasonable or convenient model imputs. The model provides a significant refinement of fallout shelter stay time representation, and contributes to the reduction in variability of the total number of simulation fallout injuries and fatalities characteristic of the range of stay time assumption currently

Table 2-2. Behavioral profiles and reasons for shelter exit.

TIME	BEHAVIORAL PROFILE	REASONS FOR LEAVING	PERCENT L BEST CASE	EFT WORST CASE
Preattack	Aware concerned Unfocused Actions	-	-	
Attack	Dazed Muted Stereotypical	-	-	
Day 1	Fuzzy Anger/Frustration Rigidity	Physical Effects Lack of Communication Lack of Direction	5.9	11.6
Day 2	Difficulty Solving Problems Fear/Anxiety Manifestations of Boredom	Physical Effects Physiological Needs Lack of Communication Lack of Direction Primary Group Separation	9.4	17.7
Day 3	Cognitive clearing Anxiety Reduction Tension Reduction	Physiological Needs Primary Group Separa- tion Need for Action	12.9	23.8
Day 4	Normal Tension/Irritability Reactions to Forced Idleness	Need to be doing something Judgment that danger was passed Organized Activity	16.3	29.8
Day 5	Normal Irritability Organized Activity	Lack of Communication Independent Judgment Primary Group Separa- tion Physiological Neec	19.8	35.9
Day 6	Normal Acceptance Differentiation of Activities	Exploration of Environ- ment Primary Group Concern Exhaustion of Resources Rescue Efforts	23.2	42.0
Day 7	Normal Directed Organized Activities	Perception of Danger over Need for Action Re-establish Community Exhaustion of Physical Resources	26.7	48.0

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employed. Although the model is based on criteria which attempt to approximate as closely as possible a post-attack environment, and upon a database which was specifically sought to reflect behavioral response due to real external threats and a spectrum of shelter types, application of the model to situations exceeding the characteristics of its database must be made with care.

For example, the Attrition Rate Model is based on data almost entirely representative of American response to disaster. Thus, application of the model to, say, the Soviet population entails a cross-cultural extropolation and assumption. One may estimate that the commonality of human response to disaster is such that all cultural response will lie somewhere within the Best and Worst cases displayed by the model. However, in the absence of additional data, this must remain an assumption. In addition, the model displays a clear distinction between the response of well-trained, well-equipped, and well-managed shelterees and the response of those ill-suited in these areas. Thus, any determined or overt program which tends to significantly accentuate these positive attributes prior to sheltering may condition behavior atypical of that displayed by the database employed. However, the methodology employed in constructing the model is largely independent of the database compiled; just the question of data availability remains. In constructing the Attrition Rate Model, only American disaster data were available.

Because the model indicates a continuous attrition of the shelterees from the shelter environment, application of model results within strategic simulations will require some process of discretization. In addition, among the eight categories of data identified, only responses characteristic of bi-polar parameters were developed. For example, for the case of training, responses reflecting either "presence of training" or "absence of training" are represented. Thus, the model does not characterize response as a function of <u>degrees</u> of training, or <u>levels</u> of communication, or <u>completeness</u> of warning, etc. However, aside from issues of model domain application of the model itself within currently employed

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strategic simulations is envisioned as a straightforward exercise, involving at most computational and integration effort.

Consequently, the Attrition Rate Model is presented in this study as an "experimental tool" for use by strategic analysts in evaluating fallout casualties in nuclear exchange simulations. For this purpose, the remainder of the report focuses on the detailed use of the model in simulations exhibiting various levels of detail. In particular, two applications are presented: model use in a "pencil-and-paper" study of fallout casualties in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, and model use in SIDAC.

# SECTION 3 APPLICATIONS OF THE ATTRITION RATE MODEL

The usefulness of the Attrition Rate Model of fallout shelter stay times developed in the previous section as a tool for the investigation of fallout casualties in strategic simulations is illustrated in this section. First, a generic guide for the application of the model is presented. This guide provides a framework within which strategic studies at various levels of detail can make use of the model. Application of the model, and use of the guide, is then presented by means of two examples: first, a 'pencil-and-paper' study of fallout casualties in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, and second, a study of casualties using the SIDAC simulation model.

# 3.1 A GENERIC GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE ATTRITION RATE MODEL

This section describes, in general terms, procedures for the implementation of the Attrition Rate Model in the calculation of strategic fallout casualties. The steps as described below were performed in the Tbilisi study. In the SIDAC study, only the last step was specifically performed; the remainder are performed automatically in the SIDAC simulation itself.

The necessary steps are as follows:

- (1) Determine the expected distribution of the post-attack population among fallout shelters.
- (2) Generate the weapon laydown and develop the resulting blast and fallout contours.
- (3) Identify those shelters destroyed by blast, and the distribution of surviving shelters among fallout radiation field intensities.
- (4) Employing the Attrition Rate Model, determine the radiation dose received by each individual as a function of his shelter protection factor and the intensity of the local fallout field.
- (5) Compute casualties based on dose received.

These guidelines are purposefully general in order that they may be applicable over a wide range of simulation detail. In the examples to follow, use of the model is keyed to investigating the sensitivity of the total number of fallout casualties to variations in stay time assumption.

# 3.2 FIRST MODEL APPLICATION: TBILISI, SOVIET GEORGIA


The study of a simulated laydown pattern on Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, was a preliminary pencil-and-paper study to demonstrate the use of the model. The goal of the study was to compare results for two traditional stay time assumptions with the results for the new Attrition Rate Model. The two traditional assumptions investigated were the Seven Day assumption (7 days in, 14 days 2/3 in) and the Two Day assumption (2 days in, 3 days 2/3 in). These were compared with the Best and Worst Cases from the Attrition Rate Model. The Best and Worst Case attrition rates are shown in Figure 3-1. Only a summary of the study is given here; further details may be found in (3).


# 3.2.1 Assumptions

In order to perform the comparison, all assumptions of the model except that of shelter stay times were held constant. For the hypothetical attack, the laydown consisted of twelve strategic RVs targeted on significant industrial or military targets in and around the city. Six RVs were employed as ground bursts; the remaining six RVs were air bursts. A simultaneous burst laydown was assumed.

The fallout was caused by a 20 knot wind blowing northwest, a direction characteristic of the area between November and April. Fallout was assumed to arrive at 1.5 hours. (This is reasonable, as we only considered the casualties within the city; downwind rural casualties were not investigated).

The distribution of population among shelters of various PFs and the shelter blast vulnerabilities were taken from an SRI study (4). The shelters were assumed to be uniformly distributed within the city boundaries. The outside protection factor was assumed to be PF=2.





Best Case y = 2.5 + 3.5t

Worst Case y = 5.5 + 6.0t

Trained
Warned
Food and Water Generally
Available
Formal Shelters
Sufficient Space
Well Managed
Outside Communication is
Possible

Not Trained
Short Warning Time
Food and Water Supplies
are Low
Informal Shelters
Cramped Surroundings
No Shelter Management
No Outside Communication

Figure 3-1. The best and worst case attrition rate models.

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To estimate shelter destruction by blast damage, the DIA blast vulnerability methodology (Physical Vulnerabilities Handbook (5)) was used. Fallout radiation fields were modeled using the EM-1 fallout methodology (6). Fallout was assumed to decay as  $t^{-1.2}$ , with t in hours.

The number of casualties was equal to:

N= (1/4) (individuals receiving between 250R and 450R)

+(3/4) (those receiving between 450R and 650R)

+(1.0) (those receiving over 650R)

All doses were received within ten days, and in most cases the majority of the dose was received within four days, so no biological repair factor was needed or used.

For ease of computation, attrition from fallout shelters was assumed to take place at 24 hour intervals, rather than continuously. This introduces no significant change in the results.

# 3.2.2 Approach

To estimate the variation in sheltered population fallout casualties in Tbilisi for each of the stay time assumptions, a two part approach was employed.

In the first part, the number of casualties per day was computed for shelters with PFs of 10, 50, 100, 200 and 500 located in fallout fields ranging in intensity (at one hour) from 300 to 10,000 rads per hour. Casualties were computed for the four different stay time assumptions: Seven Day, Two Day and the Best and Worst Cases from the Attrition Rate Model.

In the second part, a hypothetical attack on Tbilisi was considered. A laydown pattern was generated as discussed above. The resulting blast damage to shelter was computed using the Physical Vulnerabilities Handbook. Figure 3-2 shows the city boundaries and regions of shelter destruction. Fallout contours were constructed using EM-1 methodology. In Figure 3-3 the radiation field resulting from the laydown is presented. The fraction of surviving (undamaged) shelters in each radiation field was computed by overlaying each part of Figure 3-2 with Figure 3-3 and computing the area contained in each field. The resulting number of daily fallout casualties





Figure 3-2. Tbilisi city boundaries and regions of total shelter destruction.

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Figure 3-3. The fallout field of Tbilisi in thousands of rads per hour at one nour.

was then determined by estimating the percent of undestroyed shelters in fallout fields of intensity 300 to 10,000 R/hr, and employing the results of part one.

## 3.2.3 Results

Part one resulted in four graphs for each protection factor: one graph for each of the four possible stay time models. As an example, Figure 3-4 presents the results for PF=200. (Complete results may be found in (3)).


Note that the two versions of the Attrition Rate Model yield relatively smooth curves. This is because of the continuous outflow of shelterees under this model. The traditional assumptions, on the other hand, are much more jagged. In fact, by definition these curves can only take values of 0, 25, 75 and 100 percent.

The results of part two are summarized in a series of tables. Table 3-1 provides a summary of the distribution of the sheltered population both before and after the blast. In Table 3-2 the population which survived the blast is distributed by percentage among the various protection factors and radiation fields. Figure 3-5 and Table 3-3 depict the final casualty figures. (Note: In Figure 3-5 and Table 3-3, a casualty is defined as one who has received a fatal dose, not necessarily one who has already died. The actual times of death might be later than depicted in the graphics).

#### 3.2.4 Discussion

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A number of conclusions may be drawn from Figure 3-4 and similar diagrams for other protection factors. Using the Two Day and Seven Day assumptions, no casualties result from a 300 R/hr or less radiation field. Under the Attrition Rate assumption, those people who leave shelter within the first few hours were casualties. (These individuals were assumed to be sheltered from the blast, but to leave shelter before the fallout arrived.)



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Daily casualities for the first ten post-attack days as a function of stay assumption and fallout radiation intensity (in rads/hr at one hour) for shelters with PF = 200. Figure 3-4.

Summary of sheltered population distribution, blast damage, and distribution of surviving shelters in the Tbilisi fallout field. Table 3-1.

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SV I V I NG	10,000	42	42	27	50	20
ENT DISTRIBUTION OF SURVIV	3000	27	27	30	30	30
BUT I ON	1000	27	27	37	40	40
ISTRI	300	_	-	7	7	7
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF SURVIVING SHELTERS IN FALLOUT FIELD	<300 R/H 300 1000 3000 10,000	က	က	4	က	m
PERCENT OF POPULATION SURVIVING	BLAST	æ	9	æ	22	9 84
PERCENT OF SHELTERS SURVIVING	BLAST	24	24	44	74	74
PERCENT OF	POPULATION	14	26	18	30	12
PROTECTION	FACTOR	10	50	100	200	200
L		L				


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Percentages of surviving sheltered population in Tbilisi in various shelters and fallout fields. Table 3-2.

5

PROTECTION		F	FALLOUT INTENSITIES	ITIES		
FACTOR,	< 300	300	1000	3000	10,000	TOTAL
10	.21	90°	1.89	1.89	2.94	66.99
90	. 59	.12	5.44	3.44	5.35	12.74
100	99.	.33	6.01	4.87	4.38	16.25
200	1.38	3.19	18.28	13.71	9.14	45.70
200	95.	1.28	7.33	5.49	3.66	18.32
TOTALS	3.20	4.98	36.95	29.40	25.47	100.00

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Figure 3-5. Daily percentage of sheltered Tbilisi population becoming casualities within the first ten days for each of the three shelter stay time assumptions.

Table 3-3. Fallout casualities in Tbilisi (percent).

8.0     11.2     5.7       12.4     16.5     8.8       13.9     19.0     17.2       16.4     22.3     25.5       16.4     22.3     25.5       17.1     23.4     29.9       18.5     25.8     34.7       19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	DAY	ATTRITION RA BEST CASE	BEST CASE WORST CASE	TWO-DAY ASSUMPTION	SEVEN-DAY ASSUMPTION
12.4     16.5     8.8       13.9     19.0     17.2       16.4     22.3     25.5       16.4     22.3     25.5       17.1     23.4     29.9       18.5     25.8     34.7       19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     50.6     50.6	_	8.0	11.2	5.7	5.7
13.9     19.0     17.2       16.4     22.3     25.5       17.1     23.4     29.9       18.5     25.8     34.7       19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	۵	12.4	16.5	8.8	8.8
16.4     22.3     25.5       17.1     23.4     29.9       18.5     25.8     34.7       19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	က	13.9	19.0	17.2	9.3
17.1     23.4     29.9       18.5     25.8     34.7       19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	4	16.4	22.3	25.5	10.4
18.5       25.8       34.7         19.4       27.4       38.9         20.8       29.8       48.5         22.2       32.1       49.3         22.9       33.5       50.6	ર	17.1	23.4	29.9	10.4
19.4     27.4     38.9       20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	9	18.5	25.8	34.7	10.4
20.8     29.8     48.5       22.2     32.1     49.3       22.9     33.5     50.6	7	19.4	27.4	38.9	10.4
22.2 32.1 49.3 22.9 33.5 50.6	8	20.8	29.8	48.5	10.4
22.9 33.5 50.6	6	22.2	32.1	49.3	14.0
	10	22.9	33.5	50.6	17.2

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The major difference between the casualty curves for the tradinal and Attrition Rate assumptions occurs for high PF shelters. The traditional assumptions result in 100% casualties for those in high radiation fields, and 100% survival for those in low radiation fields. The Attrition Rate assumptions more realistically allow other than "all-or-nothing" choices. Casualties are higher in high fields than in low ones, but those people who remain in high PF shelters have a chance to survive in even the worst radiation fields.

As indicated in Figure 3-5, the percentage of post-attack casualties associated with the Attrition Rate stay time assumption is between 1.5 to 2 times greater than the percentage expected for the Seven Day assumption, and between 1/8 to 1/2 times less than casualties expected based on the Two Day assumption (after the fourth day). However, the Attrition Rate assumption is based on a survey of human behavioral response across a spectrum of shelter types, whereas the Two Day and Seven Day cases assume, respectively, shelters characterized by inadequate and generally adequate water availability and plumbing facilites. Thus, any comparison of these stay time assumptions must include the expected distribution of Two Daylike and Seven Daylike shelters within the country under attack.

According to the SRI study "Fallout Protection Factors for Various Countries" (4), shelters in the U.S. and Soviet Union are overwhelmingly of the Seven Day type. Two Daylike shelters are more prevalent in lesser developed countries such as Spain, Turkey, Romania, Hungary, etc. As a result, this analysis indicates that the "standard" stay time assumption for the U.S. and Soviet Union (i.e., Seven Day) probably <u>underestimates</u> post-attack casualties by between five and fifteen percentage points. In addition, as shown by the Worst Case and Best Case results of Figure 3-5, adequate training, warning, and general preparedness would reduce expected casualties between five to ten percentage points in Tbilisi. For a city of this size, this would represent approximately 60,000 civilians.

In some cases, an analyst would use both the Two Day and Seven Day stay times to investigate the variability of casualties as a function of stay time assumptions. There is a 250% difference between the Two Day and Seven Day results after ten days. The Best and Worst Cases, however, seem to reduce this variability to approximately 50%.

It should be noted that the calculations performed during this study have shown that the daily percentage of casualties expected for the Attrition Rate and Seven Day assumptions is a function of the shelter protection factor and the intensity of the local radiation field. That is, the conclusion <u>cannot</u> be made that for all PFs and fallout intensities, for example, the Attrition assumption will always generate more casualties than the Seven Day assumption. Consequently, the variation in casualties for each assumption is expected to be scenario dependent, requiring the inclusion of estimated shelter distributions within constructed fallout fields, and consideration of population allocations to those shelters.

In summary, the exemplative analysis of an attack on Tbilisi conducted for this study has shown:

- (1) The number of post-attack casualties is expected to be scenario dependent;
- (2) The inclusion of realistic behavioral assumptions in stay times (Attrition Rate assumption) generated 1.5 to 2 times <u>more</u> casualties in Tbilisi than the "traditional" assumption (Seven Day), and;
- (3) Adequate shelter preparedness generated between 1/4 and 1/3 <u>fewer</u> casualties than inadequate shelter preparedness in Tbilisi.
- (4) The Attrition Rate Model reduces the range of variability associated with stay time assumptions.

# 3.3 SECOND MODEL APPLICATION: SIDAC

#### 3.3.1 The SIDAC Model

SIDAC is a computerized analytical model designed to provide nuclear damage anlaysis information for both Red and Blue resource monitoring. It is a one-sided model that simulates land, air, and sea forces, as well as civilians and paramilitary. It can consider weapons or weapons systems individually and the modularity of its design allows the user to aggregate up to any level he wishes, depending upon his specific requirements. The model uses a mixture of deterministic and stochastic elements. Probability is used as the primary solution technique for prompt damage by means of the methodology developed by the Physical Vulnerability (PV) Division of the United States Air Force Intelligence. Delayed radiation effects are estimated by means of the methodology developed by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG).

SIDAC was developed by the Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) of the Defense Communications Agency. It is used by the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) under the aegis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The structure of SIDAC is summarized in Figure 3-6. Inputs to SIDAC consist of the strike tape (containing the weapon laydown and related weapon information), wind and weather conditions, and the data base, containing target and population information.

SIDAC uses this information to produce an Answer File, often designated by File Code 25. For our purposes, we may consider the Answer File to have one "record" (unit of output) for each possible environment. An environment may be considered to be a group of fallout shelters (of varying PFs) in a given radiation field with a given probability of blast damage.

A record contains basic identification data, such as the country and geopolitical region of the information and whether it is in an urban or rural environment. Also included are the capacity of the shelter (CAP), the probability of receiving <u>less than</u> moderate or severe blast damage (MPROB and SPROB, respectively), and the maximum cumulative biological dose (MAXDOS) which would be obtained by an individual in that environment with no fallout shielding (PF=1).




Figure 3-6. SIDAC structure and information flow.

6020/78W

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#### 3.3.2 The SIDAC Post-Processor

The SIDAC post-processor performs the actual computation of prompt and fallout casualties. The post-processor as originally developed by CCTC consists of approximately 350 lines of FORTRAN code. A listing is contained in Appendix C. This program uses the SIDAC Answer File as input and produces casualty estimates for the scenario under consideration.

As originally configured, the post-processor allowed the user to input a shelter stay time assumption to apply to the entire population. This stay time is described in two parts: the period from time 0 to time ITT represents the period of 100% shelter occupancy. The period from ITT to JTT represents the period of partial shelter occupancy. The fraction of time the shelter is occupied is designated XMULT. After time JTT, radiation exposure was assumed to drop to zero. This is due either to evacuation of the area at risk or actual decay of radiation levels to below noticable limits.

An example will serve to clarify this. Assume we want to investigate the effects of a 7 day shelter stay time followed by 14 days of two-thirds sheltering. After 21 days, evacuation takes place. All times must be in hours. Therefore, we set ITT =  $7 \times 24 = 168$  hours, JTT =  $21 \times 24 = 504$  hours and XMULT = .667. With these inputs, the program would calculate the resulting casualties. Further details are contained in Appendix B.

#### 3.3.3 The Modified Post-Processor

The post-processor as described above was modified to allow a linear attrition rate of y=at+b, as described in the Attrition Rate Model, with t=time in hours and y=proportion leaving shelter. The modifications will be described in brief here and more fully in Appendix D.

The Attrition Rate Model calls for a continuous flow of shelterees from the shelter. For computational purposes, this was approximated by a discrete model with one exodus from the shelters every 24 hours. For example, consider the linear attrition equation y = .0015t + .025. In this case, 2.5% of the shelterees leave immediately, and an additional  $.0015 \times 24 = 3.6\%$  of the shelterees leave every 24 hours.

To implement this model, a loop was inserted in the original program. ITT was started at 0 and incremented by 24 hours for each new day's population leaving shelter. JTT was held fixed at 504 hours (21 days) as it always was in the original version. The Attrition Rate Model makes no allowance for partial sheltering, so XMULT = 0.

For each value of ITT, casualty computations were made as in the original post-processor. In this case, however, the casualty figures were multiplied by that fractions of the population actually leaving shelter at time ITT. The casualties for groups leaving shelter on each day were summed to give the total casualty figures.

Again, an example will serve to clarify matters. Consider, for simplicity the attrition rate equation  $y=\frac{.25}{24}$  t + .10, with t in hours. This says that 10% of the population leaves shelter immediately, and an additional 25% leaves every 24 hours until the shelters are empty. After 72 hours, 85% have left. On day 4 (96 hours) the remaining 15% leave. We further assume that the radiation field is such that 100% of those leaving immediately die, as do 60% of those leaving after 1 day, 40% of those leaving after 2 days, 20% of those leaving after 3 days, and 10% of those leaving after 4 days. Consider a sheltered population of 1000 people. Table 3-4 summarizes the calculations. Out of 1000 people, 415 became fatalities.

The modified post-processor calculates casualties for an arbitrary attrition rate y = at + b. The two required inputs are the parameters a and b. The modifications to the original code consist of approximately 25 lines out of 350. The modified post-processor appears in Appendix D.

# 3.3.4 Method of Determining Casualties

The original and modified post-processors use almost identical methods to compute casualties. In fact, the only difference is that the modified version multiplies casualties from a given day's attrition by the proportion leaving on that day and then sums across days; the original assumes all attrition occurs at once, and so only has one group to consider. Therefore, we only consider the method in the original post-processor.

Table 3-4. Casualty calculation for hypothetical attrition rate y = 0.25t + 0.10

_ DA	<u>IY</u>	PEOPLE LEAVING	x	FATALITY FRACTION	=	NUMBER OF FATALITIES
C	)	100		1.00		100
1	ı	250		.60		150
2	?	250		.40		100
3	3	250		.20		50
4	ļ	150		.10		<u>15</u>
TOTAL		1000				415

All injury and fatality calculations are made for three time periods: 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days after the blast. Unlike the Tbilisi study discussed above, this program counted a fatality only when it actually occurred, not when the lethal dose was received.

Recall that each record in the Answer File describes one outside radiation field and level of blast damage. The population described in this record is assumed to be distributed among shelters of various PFs, as shown in Table 3-5.

The overall structure of casualty determination is:

- (1) Compute the proportion of prompt fatalities and injuries based on probabilities of damage.
- (2) For each radiation field and protection factor, compute the proportion of fallout fatalities and injuries.
- (3) Multiply number of shelterees by proportion of prompt fatalities to obtain the number of prompt fatalities.
- (4) Multiply number of <u>remaining</u> shelterees (not killed by prompt effects) by proportion of fallout casualties to obtain the number of fallout fatalities.
- (5) Multiply number of <u>still</u> <u>remaining</u> shelterees by proportion of prompt injuries to obtain the number of <u>prompt</u> injuries.
- (6) After subtracting the number of fatalities and prompt injuries, multiply the number of remaining snelterees by the proportion of fallout injuries to obtain the number of <u>fallout injuries</u>. Note: Steps 5 and 6 imply that joint prompt and fallout injuries are counted simply as prompt injuries.
- (7) The uninjured, <u>healthy population</u> is the remaining population after subtracting all casualties.
- (8) This procedure is performed for each data record, and the results are summed.

This procedure is described in more detail in Appendix B.

Table 3-5. Distribution of shelterees for urban and rural environments.\*

	URBAN	RURAL		
PF	PERCENT	PF	PERCENT	
800	14	40	2	
250	7	35	5	
150	7	30	15	
100	14	25	8	
40	28	20	22	
20	17	15	6	
10	13	10	42	

<sup>\*</sup> These shelter distributions may be explicitly overruled by input data, but this was never done during our sample runs.

## 3.3.5 The SIDAC Run

CCTC provided a SIDAC Answer File for analysis. The scenario was based on a Soviet attack on the U. S. For classification reasons, details of the SIDAC scenario are omitted. Because of this, the actual casualty figures should not be considered as representative of all SIDAC runs. However, the relative spread of results is significant.

Fallout shelter stay times were varied to investigate the sensitivity of casualty figures to stay times. Nine different assumptions were used:

- (1) 3/4 day fully sheltered, 20¼ days 2/3 sheltered
- (2) 2 days fully sheltered, 19 days 2/3 sheltered
- (3) 3 days fully sheltered, 18 days 2/3 sheltered
- (4) 5 days fully sheltered, 16 days 2/3 sheltered
- (5) 7 days fully sheltered, 15 days 2/3 sheltered
- (6) 14 days fully sheltered, 7 days 2/3 sheltered
- (7) 21 days fully sheltered
- (8) Attrition rate Best Case, y = .0014t + .025, no partial sheltering 1/
- (9) Attrition rate Worst Case, y = .0025t + .055, no partial
  sheltering.1/

For all nine cases, radiation exposure is assumed to end at 21 days due to evacuation or the decay of radiation intensity to insignificant levels. Note that this means No. 7 is equivalent to indefinite sheltering.

It is instructive to consider alternative stay times that provide identical effective protection factors for the 21-day period. Some of these are shown in Table 3-6.

### 3.3.6 Results

The SIDAC data base assumes a total U.S. population of 214.6 million. Of these, 131.4 million are urban, while 83.2 million are rural. The post-processor provides separate casualty figures for the urban and rural populations.

For Nos. 8 and 9, t is in hours.

Table 3-6. Effective protection factors and equivalent exit days.

PF		<u>10</u>	1	<u>00</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>50</u>	<u> 8</u>	300
SIDAC STAY TIME ASSUMPTION	<sup>PF</sup> e	EXIT DAY	PFe	EXIT DAY	<sup>PF</sup> e	EXIT DAY	PF <sub>e</sub>	EXIT DAY
2 days fully sheltered, 19 days 2/3 sheltered	6.6	8.2	15	8.6	16	8.5	17	8.6
3 days fully sheltered, 18 days 2/3 sheltered	7.2	10.2	18	10.2	20	10.2	21	10.1
5 days fully sheltered, 16 days 2/3 sheltered	7.8	12.3	23	12.3	27	12.4	29	12.3
7 days fully sheltered, 14 days 2/3 sheltered	8.3	14.2	29	14.1	35	14.1	39	14.2

# **DEFINITIONS:**

 $PF_e$  = Effective protection factor Equivalent exit day = the day such that complete sheltering up to that day and no sheltering after it gives the same  $PF_e$  as the corresponding SIDAC stay time assumption.

# ASSUMPTIONS:

Fallout arrives at 1½ hours Outside PF = 1/.65 = 1.538 The actual post-processor output is provided in Appendix E. This section contains a summary and analysis of the results.

Prompt fatality calculations are independent of subsequent fall out shelter stay times. Therfore, every set of results has the same number of prompt fatalities. For this scenario, 92.1 million of the urban population (70.1%) and 7.5 million of the rural population (9.0%) were prompt fatalities.

Prompt injuries are slightly dependent on fallout sheltering. (A prompt injury can become a fallout fatality, and this can happen at different times for different levels of sheltering.) However, the figures are relatively constant over time and for each scenario. For comparative purposes, figures of 23.0 million urban prompt injuries (17.5%) and 11.5 million rural prompt casualties (13.8%) were used. Actual results differed from these by no more than two or three percentage points. The actual results are available in Appendix E.

The post-processor provides casualty figures for three different points in time: 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days after the attack. Fallout fatalities and injuries are assessed on the basis of maximum biological dose (MBD) received. In cases of shorter shelter stay times (less than 5 days) this MBD is received before the seventh day, and so the 7 day casualty figures are accurate. However, for longer stay times, this MBD is not received until sometime after seven days have elapsed, so the 7 day fallout casualty figures are inaccurate.

Because of the high percentage of prompt casualties, only a small fraction of the total population was at risk (i.e., alive after the blast) for fallout casualty calculations. In addition this fraction was different for urban and rural populations. Therefore, in presenting fallout fatalities, the percentages were normalized to the population at risk by dividing by the fraction of population which were not prompt fatalities. Similarly, for fallout casualties, the percentages were normalized by dividing by the fraction not prompt fatalities or injuries.


With these points in mind, consider the casualty figures presented in Figure 3-7 and 3-8. Figure 3-7 presents fallout fatalities for the nine stay times and for both the urban and rural populations (left and right graphs, respectively). Figure 3-8 presents similar information for fallout injuries.

Notice that the error in the 7 day figures discussed above is readily apparent. If there were no error, the 7 day, 14 day, and 21 day stay time figures would be identical. The differences demonstrate that the MBD is not always received by the seventh day.

These graphs effectively illustrate the major goal in developing the Attrition Rate Model: reduction in variability associated with sheltering estimates. At 180 days, there is a 500% difference in urban fatalities and a 250% difference in rural casualties between the 21 day full sheltering assumption and the 3/4 day full,  $19\frac{1}{4}$  day 2/3 sheltering assumption. The difference between the Best and Worst Case is roughly 50% for urban fatalities and 25% for rural fatalities. Similar relative differences, although much smaller in actual numbers, exist for the injury graph.

The Worst and Best Cases are approximated by the 2 day fully sheltered, 19 day partial sheltered and the 3 day sheltered, 18 day partial sheltered assumptions. However, note that from Table 3-6, the 2 day sheltered, 19 day partially sheltered stay time provides the same protection as an 8.6 day fully sheltered stay, followed by 12.4 days out in the local radiation field (for a total of 21 days) before evacuation. The 3 day sheltered, 18 day partially sheltered stay time is equivalent to 10.2 days in a shelter, followed by 10.8 days in the local radiation field before evacuation. These numbers indicate that care must be exercised in attempting to compare results of the Attrition Rate Model with one "equivalent" stay time; there are many combinations of stay times which provide equivalent protection.

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Figure 3-7. Fallout fatalities for urban and rural populations.




Figure 3-8. Fallout injuries for urban and rural populations.

There is a significant difference in the computer time needed to perform these runs. The runs were made on a Honeywell 6000 series computer running under the GCOS operating system. A single run of one of the Attrition Rate assumption took roughly 9 times longer than a single run of one of the traditional stay time assumptions. However, recall that the post-processor was designed to work for the traditional assumptions, and "brute force" was used to make it handle the Attrition Rate assumptions. A program properly designed specifically for the Attrition Rate assumptions could be expected to improve on these figures considerably.

The Best and Worst Case results are roughly parallel to the more traditional stay time results on each of the four graphs. They also lie roughly in the same range, i.e., near the results for 2 day and 3 day stay times. However, all four graphs come from only one SIDAC scenario, one with a very large proportion of blast casualties. One may hypothesize that these relationships hold in general for other scenarios, or that the 3 day fully sheltered, 18 day partially sheltered stay time, for example, produces the same number of casualties as the Best Case. To date, these conjectures remain just that, and further work is needed to substantiate them.

#### 3.4 SUMMARY

The Attrition Rate Model displays three advantages as a tool for the investigation of fallout casualties. First, it has a basis in a real data base analyzed using the methods of the behavioral sciences. As such, it provides a justification for the use of model stay times; a justification absent in previous stay time assumptions. Second, the Attrition Rate Model reduces the variability associated with a variety of shelter stay times. Third, the methodology used to derive the Attrition Rate equations can be applied to a variety of behavioral problems. If appropriate data bases are available, one may apply these methods to develop empirical models in other fields.

# SECTION 4 FURTHER APPLICATIONS

Among the initial objectives of this study was the development of a tool for use in strategic simulations with the purpose of reducing the variability in simulated results supported by the "human element". The Attrition Rate Model represents such a tool with respect to fallout shelter stay times. In the previous section, two applications of the model were presented. These applications focused on an investigation of the sensitivity of fallout casualties to stay time assumption. In this chapter, additional applications of the model are suggested. These include extensions of the type of research exemplified by the applications in Section 3, as well as more detailed use of the model.

# 4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPLETE SET OF ATTRITION RATE EQUATIONS

The first application is to modify the SIDAC post-processor (Appendix D) to accept the complete set of 24 different Attrition Rate equations. These equations were previously presented in Table 2-4.

There are two distinct parts to the modification, corresponding to the two different functional forms of equations. For the linear equations (y = at + b) almost no modification is needed. The program is already designed to handle the two linear equations describing the Best and Worst Cases. The only required inputs are the parameters a and b (designated AA and BB in the modified code, Appendix D). By inputting the proper a and b, the current post-processor will handle any of the linear equations.

Of the 24 equations, 5 take the simple exponential form  $y = at^{D}$ . This is slightly more difficult to handle in that the code as currently structured cannot handle an exponential stay time. But the addition of this capability is fairly straightforward.

By adding this capability, variations in fallout casualties due to the range of response in each of the eight data categories summarized in Table 2-4 could be investigated. For example, the impact of training vs no training, or good shelter management vs poor shelter management on population survival could be analyzed. With this information, the analyst could investigate each of the eight variables, rather than just the best and worst case summaries.

## 4.2 ADDITIONAL SCENARIOS

To date, only one SIDAC scenario has been run as described in Section 3.3. It is impossible to draw general conclusions about model behavior on the basis of one run. Many different scenarios must be considered and the variability of the results must be examined. In this way we can investigate various hypothesis about shelter stay times with range of scenarios could answer questions concerning:

- (1) The existence of simple stay time assumptions "equivalent" to the Best and Worst Case Attrition Rate Model;
- (2) The impact of the Attrition Rate Model assumption for various degrees of evacuation posture;
- (3) The range of casualties between the Best and Worst case responses;
- (4) The variation of fallout casualties under a variety of weapon laydown patterns; and
- (5) Other hypothesis concerning the model.

It is a simple matter to implement this application. Each SIDAC run should be made in the usual way, generating an Answer File. This Answer File is then run through the modified post-processor and the results analyzed as in Section 3.3. These results will yield general rules which the Attrition Rate Model follows.

As an example, consider the claim that a 3 days sheltered, 18 days partially sheltered stay time yields casualty figures approximately equal to the Best Case. This is borne out in the one scenario that has been studied. Should this prove to be the case over a number of widely varying scenarios, we would consider the claim validated. If this claim were true, we could use it to an advantage. Recall the modified post-processor uses more computer time than the original. If we could model the Best Case results by using the 3 day stay time, we could simulate the use of the Attrition Rate Model while saving on computer expense.

#### 4.3 OTHER SIMULATION MODELS

The post-processor presented in Appendix D is designed to work only in the SIDAC system. However, there are currently a number of other models within the defense community which are employed to estimate strategic fallout casualties. Among these are CIVIC, COBRA, READY, and RISK II. Through appropriate modifications these programs could be made to handle the Attrition Rate equations. In this way the Attrition Rate Model of casualty prediction could be more widely available for use throughout the community.

Because modifications to the SIDAC post-processor were straightforward (although by no means trivial), there is every reason to believe that a similar effort could be made to modify the casualty prediction sections of the other simulations. For example, in CIVIC (Civilian Vulnerability Indicator Code, (8)) the Attrition Rate equations should be inserted in Overlay (5,0), the Initial and Fallout Effects Damage Assessment Overlay, and more specifically, in Secondary Overlay (5,4), entitled EVAL5, Assess Casualties and Fatalities from Individual Weapons - Initial and Fallout Effects. Modifications to other simulation models should be quite similar.

## 4.4 ALTERNATIVE DATA BASES

The methodology outlined in Section 2 for the construction of the Attrition Rate model is not limited to one specific data base. For this study, data were extracted from readily available investigations of U.S. disasters and behavior. Thus, the model is most applicable to U.S. populations.

If a data base of Soviet disasters were available, one could reperform the analysis to obtain a similar set of equations based on Soviet psychological responses. This data would more accurately reflect those psychological aspects which differ in American and Soviet societies. With this data base one could feel more confident in making statements about the Soviet reaction to a nuclear disaster.

This technique is not limited to fallout shelter studies. If an appropriate data base exists, subjects such as industrial production under adverse circumstances or recovery after stress could be investigated.

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# APPENDIX A

# THE SIDAC INSTRUCTION SET

Table A-1 contains the set of instructions used by CCTC to generate the SIDAC run. It is presented here without comment. It may be of use to those familiar with SIDAC who desire to reproduce the results presented in this document.

Table A-1. The SIDAC instruction set (continued).

```
IF SCATOD NE 1494491 3-1 TAROPE-15
IF SOMEOPO EN 141 ANNO DESCRIPTION FOR 1991. DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION
TE PEOCIN EN ICY! PELL COMOPOSI
   30E0P0 EG 151. UET 30E0P0=4
1- 63E0PO E0 |TT. 5=1 59E0PU=4
IF SCATCD EC 1751001. SET MODIVOLEDUAL
IF SCATCD EG +75100+. SET SEVVOLFOUR.
IF STELAG ED 111. SET SEVVULEDUAL
  STELAG ED 11. SET ACEVOLECUAD
IF STELAG EG 131. SET SEVVUL=CUX1
*F STFLAG EQ 131. SE! //SVOL=COX1
IF SCATCO LO 1750991. SET NOUVOLEDUAL
IF 504TCD at 1/50991. 2-1 350000-00000
FUNCTION : INLCD
CREATE
LOAD
DEC!
FUNCTION UPDATE
ಗ೯೦೮೩೨
FCRE05=04
HINDNO=10
- ARTIY=77100000000
      FUNCTION PEFGET!
SCOUP=1.IF SCATCO FO 175100.1.
CORT=UGECPU/ADSLUCTR/A
ondurate Scales Ex 1/50941.
TORT=SGEOPOXABSLUCTRYA
00000=3.15 SCATOS EG +759601.
さり戻す申回GEOHCノムコとこじで手帳/A
       FILE
               07 · V5R
               08.475
       FILE
       1APE9 10 + P / W + 20408 + + 1 + H / I
       FILE
               11 • 1 -
       FILE
               12 . V2H . 1 FUH
       FILE
                13.V36.200L
       FILE
                14 . V4~
       ے ہے، پہرے
                15/E90+R+5+0301010F00/19 E 10 10
       FILE
               16.01K.2H
       FILE
                20 • 130
       IAPE
                P6.610.10014.000.
```

# APPENDIX B CASUALTY CALCULATIONS

This appendix supplements the material in Section 3.3. It describes the steps required to compute casualties in the SIDAC post-processor.

The first step is to compute the proportions of the population at risk which become prompt fatalities, prompt injuries, fallout fatalities, and fallout injuries.

By assumption, the proportion of prompt fatalities (PFAT) equals the probability of severe damage = 1-SPROBS, where SPROBS is provided in the Answer File. Similarly, the proportion of prompt casualties (PCAS) (i.e., fatalities and injuries) equals the probability of moderate damage = 1-MPROBS. Therefore, proportion of injuries = PCAS-PFAT. (SPROBS and MPROS were previously defined in Section 3.3.1).

The fallout casualty calculations are more complicated. For each of the 7 day, 30 day, and 180 day time periods, a "mid-lethal dose" (MLD) and a "mid-casualty dose" (MCD) are provided. (Here casualty refers to injuries alone). Associated with these main doses are their standard deviations, "standard deviation for lethality" (SDL) and "standard deviation for casualty" (SDC), respectively. For further information on radiation doses, see (6).

Recall that MAXDOS is the maximum biological dose which would be received in a given environment if no protection existed (PF=1). To scale MAXDOS appropriately, we use that shielding value (SHLVAL) such that MAXDOS x SHLVAL = actual dose received by a sheltered individual. This shielding factor is merely the reciprocal of the effective protection factor. For each data record, there are seven values of SHLVAL, one for each PF as shown in Table 3-5. The percentage of people corresponding to a given PF is SHLPCT.

Mathematically, we define

$$SHLVAL = \frac{DRM(1)/PF1 + DRM(2) \times (XMULT(1)/PF1 + XMULT(2)/PF2)}{DRM(1) + DRM(2)}$$

where

(See Section 3.3.2, for discussion of ITT and JTT.)

Further details on these quantities may be found in the Appendix of (4).

As stated above DOSE = MAXDOS x SHLVAL is the actual maximum dose received by an individual in the given fallout field and shelter. We must now determine what proportion of the population at risk this dose kills or injures. This is accomplished using the normal probability distribution.

Denote by  $\Phi(x)$  the cumulative normal probability at x. Let I be the index counting the seven possible PFs as shown in Table 3-5. Then the proportion of fatalities caused by the radiation dose DOSE(I) is

FAT = 
$$\sum_{I=1}^{7}$$
 SHLPCT(I) x  $\Phi$   $\left(\frac{DOSE(I) - MLD}{SDL}\right)$ 

where

MLD = mid-lethal dose and SDL is its standard deviation.

Similarly, the proportion of injuries caused by DOSE(I) is

CAS = 
$$\sum_{I=1}^{7}$$
 SHLPCT(I)  $\times \Phi \left( \frac{DOSE(I) - MCD}{SDC} \right)$ 

where

MCD = mid-casualty dose, and SDC is its standard deviations. Note that MLD, MCD, SDL, and SDC are different for each time period (7 day, 30 day, or 180 day). Thus, this whole calculation is repeated three times.

We now have the four casuality proportions PFAT, PCAS, FAT, and CAS. The total population at risk (capacity of the shelter) is CAP. Following steps 3-7 as outlined in Section 3.3.4, we calculate actual casualties as follows:

NPF = Number prompt fatalities = PFAT x CAP

NFF = Number fallout fatalities = FAT x (1-PFAT) x CAP

NPI = Number prompt injuries = (PCAS-PFAT) x (1-FAT) x CAP

NFI = Number fallout injuries = (1-PCAS) x (1-FAT) x CAS x CAP

NHP = Number healthy population = CAP-(NPF+NFF+NPI+NFI)

This completes the computation for one data record. We repeat this entire procedure for each data record and sum the results.

To illustrate this procedure, consider the following example. Let MPROBS = .5 and SPROBS = .7. This means that probability of moderate damage = PCAS = .5, and probability of severe damage = PFAT = .3. Let CAP = 1000, MAXDOS = 4000. Assume that for the time period in question,

MLD = 500 MCD = 200 SDL = 200 SDC = 50. For simplicity, assume the following shelter distribution:

<u>PF</u>	PERCENT
200	20
50	50
10	30

We compute casualties resulting from a 3 day stay time followed by 18 days of 2/3 sheltering.

First, we compute three values of SHLVAL, one for each PF. ITT = end of period of 100% sheltering = 3 days = 72 hours. JTT = end of partial sheltering = 21 days = 504 hours.

DRM(1) = 
$$1 - ITT^{-0.2} = .575$$
  
DRM(2) =  $ITT^{-0.2} - JTT^{-0.2} = .137$   
PF1 = 200, 50, and 10, respectively  
PF1 =  $1/.65 = 1.538$   
XMVLT(1) =  $2/3 = .667$   
XMVLT(2) =  $1/3 = .333$ 

Therefore, for PF1 = 200,

SHLVAL(1) = 
$$\frac{.575/200 + .137(.667/200 + .333/1.538)}{.575 + .137}$$
  
= .046

Similarly, for PF1 = 50, SHLVAL(2) = .058, and for PF1 = 10, SHLVAL(3) = .135.

We now compute FAT and CAS by filling in Table B-1. By summing the two indicated columns, we find FAT = .23 and CAS = .74, i.e., 23% of the at risk population are fatalities and 74% are casualities. From before, we had PFAT = .30 and PCAS = .50. We now compute

NPF =  $.30 \times 1000 = 300$  prompt fatalities NFF =  $.23 \times .70 \times 1000 = 161$  fallout fatalities NPI =  $(.50 - .30) \times (1 - .23) \times 1000 = 154$  prompt injuries NFI =  $(1 - .50) \times (1 - .23) \times .74 \times 1000 = 285$  fallout injuries NNHP = 1000 - (300 + 161 + 154 + 285) = 100 uninjured people.

This data record has been completed; we would now get another record, compute the same quantities, and add them to these results.

Table B-1. Fallout casualty calculations.

SHLPT × +Cas	.0748	3692	3000	CAS = .7443
es Ses	.374	.739	١.000	
DOSE-MCD SDC	32	<b>9</b> 9.	6.8	
SHLPCT × Fatal	\$110.	.0450	1737	FAT = .2301
• Fatal	.057	060.	619.	
108 -MLD	-1.58	-1.34	.20	
DOSE = SHLVAL × MAXDOS	184	232	540	
SHLVAL	.046	.058	.135	
SHL PCT	.20	.50	8.	
ja.	200	20	01	

Assumptions:

MAXD0S = 4000MLD = 500 MCD = 200SDL = 200 SDC = 50 This table illustrates the calculations used to compute fatality and casualty proportions. The first four columns apply to the entire population, the next three show the fatality calculations.

Legend:

PF = Protection factor

SHLVAL = Shelter percentage

SHLVAL = Shielding Value

MLD = Mid-lethal dose

SDL = Standard deviation of MLD

MCD = Mid-casualty dose

SDC = Standard deviation of MCD

G = Cumulative normal

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## APPENDIX C

### THE ORIGINAL SIDAC POST-PROCESSOR

Table C-1 contains a listing of the original SIDAC post-processor as written by the Command and Control Technical Center. What follows, while not a complete documentation, is intended to serve as a guide to the program segments.

LINE NUMBERS IN TABLE C-1	FUNCTION
1 - 30	Initialization
31 - 72	Initial data acquisition, continued initialization
73 -103	Read a record and assign values to variables
105 -119	Default values for PFs and percen- tages urban population
120 -134	Default values for PFs and percen- tages rural population
135 -170	Additional initialization and error calls
171 -238	The bulk of the computations see further comments below
239 -342(end)	Output and bookkeeping routines.

As noted above, lines 171-238 comprise the bulk of the computations. To aid in comprehension, some of the key variable one identified here. The actual flow of the computations is fairly clear.

There are many do-loops which run from 1 to 7. (See lines 171, 184, 187, 190, etc.). These index the seven different PFs per environment. Do-loops from 1 to 3 index the three different assessment times, 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days. PR1 is the inside protection factor; PR2 is the outside

protection factor; set equal to 1/.65. The proportion of partial sheltering spent indoors, denoted XMULT(1), is equal to 1-XMULT (2). ITT is time at end of complete sheltering; JTT is time at end of partial sheltering and marks beginning of evacuation. DRM(1) and DRM(2) are dose rate multipliers for each time period. SHLVAL is the reciprocal of the effective protection factor.

SMLD (I), SIGL(I), SMLD(I), and SIGC(I) are mid-lethal dose, its standard deviation, the mid-casualty dose, and its standard deviation, respectively, for the assessment time indexed by I =1, 2, or 3. The actual values they assume (in lines 224-231 and lines 15-18) are from reference (6). (MAXDOS) x (SHLVAL) is the actual dose received. CUMN is a subroutine which computes the cumulative normal distribution. FAT and CAS store the percentage of fatalities and casualties, respectively. In lines 240-246, these percentages are converted to actual population counts.

To run this program, the Answer File must be available as device number 25. Device 5 is the card reader, so all reads to device 5 must find the data located after the source code.

Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor.

```
DIMENSION IPROF(2,5,7), ISHPCT(5,7), IMULT(2,5), ISHLV(7),
               SISHLP(7),DRM(2),ITX(4),IPCTF(5)
  2
                DIMENSION XMULT(2,5)
                CHARACTER ICC+2(5)
                CHARACTER TITLE1 +20, TITLE2 +20, TITLE3 +20, TITLE4 +3
                CHARACTER JNAM+5,TOPOS+8,SPAC1+4,SPAC2+3
CHARACTER ISUB+1,SVSU3+1
                DIMENSION ALIN(3,6,3), PCT(7), ATEM(6,3), IFAT(3), ICAS(3), FAT(3),
               5 CAS(3), COM(38)
 10
                CHARACTER IRG+1 ,SVRG+
CHARACTER ICTY+2/* */,SVCTY+2/* */
                CHARACTER
                                                 ,SVRG+1,ITIME+3(3),INAM+5(2),ICAT+1
                DATA ITX /24,72,240,723/
DATA ITIME/' 7',' 30','180'/
 12
 13
 14
                DIMENSION SHLVAL(16),SHLPCT(16),SMLD(3),SMCD(3),SIGL(3),SIGC(3)
 15
                DATA SMLD/1000..0..450./
                DATA SMCD/200.,215.,400./
 16
 17
                DATA SIGL/200.,1.,135./
                DATA SIGC/60.,64.5,120./
 18
 19
                DATA SHLVAL/.01,.075,.15,.2,.3,.35,.7,
               $.1,.15,.2,.25,.3,.4,.55,.6,.7/
 20
                DATA SHLPCT/.05,.12,.045,.385,.09,.21,.1,
 21
 22
               3.307,.0035,.036,.0105,.065,.075,.253,.25,.3/
                DIMENSION XSHLV(8) , KSHLP(400)
 23
 24
                CHARACTER KCTY+2(50)
 25
                DATA XSHLV/200.,130.,53.,20.,10.,5.,3.,1.4/
                DATA ISHLV/200,100,50,20,10,5,3/
 26
 27
                REAL MPROBS
 28
                IPAC=0
 29
                REWIND 25
 30
                REWIND 10
 31
                1=1
                KCTY(I)="
 32
 33
           1011 READ(10,1012,END=1013)<CTY(I),(KSHLP(8+(I-1)+J),J=1,8)
           1012 FORMAT (A2,812)
 34
 35
                I=I+1
                GO TO 1011
 36
 37
           1013 CONTINUE
 38
                READ (5,100) TITLE1,TITLE2,TITLE3,TITLE4
 39
           100 FORMAT (3A20,A3)
                READ (5,449,END=2121) ITT,JTT
 40
 41
           449 FORMAT (14,14)
 42
                IF(JTT.EQ.O)JTT=504
                IF(JTT.GE.ITT)GO TO 3131
 43
                KTT=JTT
                JTT=[TT
 45
 46
                ITT=<TT
 47
           3131 CONTINUE
 48
                DO 46 J=1,5
 49
                READ (5,30,EN0=46)
                                          A(L(S)TJUMIA(L(T)TJUMIA(L)DDI
                                     (IPROF(1,J,K),K=1,7),(IPROF(2,J,K),K=1,7),
 50
 51
               $(ISHPCT(J,K),K=1,7),IPCTF(J)
 52
           30
                FORMAT (
                           A2,213,1413,712,11)
                CONTINUE
 53
           46
           2121
 54
                  CONTINUE
 55
                ISUB=1H
                SVSU3=14
 56
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```

Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
57
                 MIL=1000000.
 58
                 J VAM= "URBAN"
 59
                 SPACT=4H
 60
                 SPAC2=3H
                 SVCTY=2H
 61
 62
                 SVRG=1H
 63
                 H8=209CT
 64
                 IEOF=3
 65
                 ILIN=60
 66
                 IFLAS=0
 67
                 00 21 11=1,3
                 00 21 12=1.6
 68
 69
                 00 21 13=1,3
                 ALIN(11,12,13)=0.
 70
 71
                 ATEM(12,13)=3.
 72
           21
                 CONTINUE
 73
                 READ (25, END=98) COM
 74
                 MPROBS=COM(4)
 75
                 SPROBS=COM(5)
 76
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,163,1CAP,1,6)
 77
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 183, IRG, 1, 1)
 78
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 181, ICTY, 1, 2)
 79
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 189, ISU3, 1, 1)
 80
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,171,1FAT(1),5,2)
 81
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 175, IFAT (2), 5, 2)
 82
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 179, 1FAT(3), 5, 2)
 83
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 169, ICAS(1), 5, 2)
 84
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,173,1CAS(2),5,2)
 85
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,177,1CAS(3),5,2)
 86
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 184, ICAT, 1,5)
 87
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,043,MAXDOS,1,6)
 88
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 337, IDMD05, 1,6)
 89
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,193, ISHLV(1),4,3)
 90
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 196, ISHLV(2), 4,3)
 91
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 199, ISHLV(3), 4,3)
 92
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,202, ISHLV(4),4,3)
 93
                 CALL BYTE (CO4, 205, ISHLV (5), 4, 3)
 94
                 CALL BYTE(CO4,208,ISHLV(6),4,3)
 95
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 223, ISHLV(7), 4,3)
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 191, ISHLP(1), 5,2)
 96
 97
                 CALL BYTE(COM,211,ISHLP(2),5,2)
 98
                 CALL BYTE(COM,213, [SHLP(3),5,2)
 99
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 215, ISHLP(4),5,2)
100
                 CALL BYTE(COM,217,ISHLP(5),5,2)
101
                 CALL BYTE(COM,219, ISHLP(6),5,2)
                 CALL BYTE(COM,221,15HLP(7),5,2)
102
                 IF(ICAT.EQ."75399".OR.ICAT.EQ."750990")GO TO 251
103
104
                 ISHLV(1)=800
105
                 ISHLV(2)=250
                ISHLV(3)=150
106
107
                 ISHLV(4)=100
108
                ISHLV(5)=40
1 09
                ISHLV(5)=20
110
                ISHLV(7)=10
111
                ISHLP (1)=14
112
                ISHLP(2)=7
```

Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
113
                ISHLP(3)=7
114
                ISHLP(4)=14
115
                ISHLP(5)=28
116
                ISHLP(6)=17
117
                ISHLP(7)=13
118
                GD TO 252
           251 ISHLV(1)=40
119
120
                ISHLV(2)=35
121
                ISHLV(3)=30
122
                ISHLV(4)=25
123
                ISHLV(5)=20
124
                ISHLV(6)=15
125
                ISHLV(7)=10
126
                ISHLP(1)=2
127
                ISHLP(2)=5
128
                ISHLP(3)=15
129
                ISHL@(4)=8
130
                ISHL@(5)=22
131
                ISHL = (6) =6
132
                ISHLP(7)=42
133
           252 CONTINUE
                IF(ICTY.EQ."US")GO TO 1017
134
135
                DO 1314 JJ=1,50
                IF(KCTY(JJ).EQ." ")G0 TO 1017
136
           1014 IF(ICTY.EQ.KCTY(JJ))GO TO 1015
137
138
           1015 DO 1316 KK=1,7
139
                ISHLV(KK)=XS4LV(KX)
140
           1016 ISHLP(KK)=KSHLP((JJ-1)+8+KK)
141
           1017 CONTINUE
142
                IF (IFLAG.EQ.1) GO TO 52
143
                SVCTY=ICTY
144
                SVRG=IRG
145
                SVSU9=ISU8
146
                CONTINUE
147
                CAP=FLDAT(ICAP)
                IF(ICAT_EQ."75100".OR.ICAT_EQ."751000")CAP=CAP+1000.
IF(ICAT_EQ."75099".OR.ICAT_EQ."750990")CAP=CAP+100.
1 48
149
150
                DO 23 J=1,3
151
                FAT(J)=1FAT(J)+.01
                CAS(J)=1CAS(J)+.01
152
153
           23
                CONTINUE
154
                IVT=1
155
                INF=7
156
                IF (IPAC.EQ.5) INT=8
157
                IF (IPAC_EQ.5) INF=15
                00 191 13=1,3
158
159
                CAS(13)=0.
160
                FAT(13)=0.
161
           191
               CONTINUE
162
                11=1
163
                IF(II.EQ.6) GO TO 201
164
                If(ICC(II).EQ.ICTY.OR.ICC(II).EQ.'XX')
                                                                GO TO 146
165
                11=11+1
166
                GO TO 44
           201
167
                PRINT 202
168
                FORMAT (15x,/////, 'CARD XX MISSING')
```

Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
169
                CALL EXIT
          146
170
                DO 143 LL=1,7
171
                SHLPCT(LL)=FLOAT(ISHLP(LL))/100.
          143
         C *** THE CALCULATION USES ONLY THE PCT DIST.IN THE DATA RECORD.HOWEVER
172
173
          C *** ISHPCT HAS BEEN READ IN AND PGM CAN BE MODIFIED
         C *** IT IS ASSUMED THAT THERE WILL BE ONLY ONE PCT DIST. FOR BOTH
174
         C *** (POSSIBLE) SETS OF PROTECTION FACTORS (IPROF).
175
176
          C *** THE FORM OF THE CALCULATION ASSUMED FOR THE SECOND TIME PERIOD
177
         C *** IS IST MULT*(1./1ST PROT. FACT.) + 2ND MULT*(1./2ND P.F.).
178
         C *** ALSO IT IS ASSUMED THAT 1ST PERIOD USES THE PROT. FACT. IN THE
179
         C *** DATA BASE RECORD.
180
         C ***
181
         C *** IPCTF IS THE FLAG TO USE NEW PCT DIST. OR NOT.
                IF(IPCTF(II).EQ.0) GO TO 144
182
183
                DO 145 LL=1,7
184
           145
                SHLPCT(LL) = FLOAT(ISHPCT(II, LL))/100.
185
           144
                IF(II.LT.6) GO TO 147
186
                00 148 JJ=1,7
187
           148
                SHLVAL(JJ)=FLOAT(ISHLV(JJ))/100.
188
                GO TO 991
189
           147
               00 149 K=1,7
190
                PR1=FLOAT(IPROF(1,II,K))
191
                PR2=FLOAT(IPROF(2,II,K))
1 92
                If(IPROF(1,II,K).LE.O) PR1=FLOAT(ISHLV(K))
193
                IF(IPROF(2,II,K).LE.O) PR2=FLOAT(ISHLV(K))
194
         C *** IF THE PROTECTION FACTOR IN THE DATA BASE RECORD AND THEPROT.
195
         C *** FACT. IN THE CHANGE CARD ARE BOTH O, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE
196
         C *** PROT. FACT. # 1./.65
                IF(IPROF(1,II,K).LE.J.AND.ISHLV(K).LE.D) PR1=1./.65
197
198
                IF(IPROF(2,II,K).LE.O.AND.ISHLV(K).LE.O) PR2=1./.65
                IF(IPROF(1,II,K).EQ. 1) PR1=1./.65
IF(IPROF(2,1I,K).EQ. 1) PR2=1./.65
199
2 00
201
                IF(DR4(1)+DR4(2).LE.D) SHLVAL(K)=.65
202
                XMULT(1,II)=FLOAT(IMULT(1,II))/100.
203
                XMULT(2,11)=FLOAT(IMULT(2,11))/100.
204
                O.1=(II, 1) TUPX (C.93.(II, 2) TUPIL DNA. O.93.(II, 1) TUPIL O.
                DRM(1)=1-ITT++(-.2)
205
204
                DRM(2)=ITT++(-.2)-JTT++(-.2)
                IF((ICTY.EQ."JA".OR.ICTY.EQ."TW").AND.K.EQ.1)PR1=1.4
207
                IF(ICTY.EQ."TW".AND.K.EQ.1)SHLPCT(1)=.3
IF(ICTY.EQ."JA".AND.K.EQ.1)SHLPCT(1)=.4
208
209
210
                FAC1=DRM(1)+(1./PR1)
211
                FAC2=XMULT(1,[[)+(1./PR1)
212
                FAC3=XMULT(2,11)+(1./PR2)
213
                FAC4=DRM(2)
                                      +(FAC2+FAC3)
214
                F4C5=DRM(1)+DRM(2)
215
                FAC6=FAC1+FAC4
216
                SHLVAL(K)=FAC6/FAC5
217
           149
                CONTINUE
218
           991
                CONTINUE
219
                INT=1
2 2 0
                INF=7
                00 999 11=1,3
221
5 5 5
                DO 999 17=INT, INF
223
                S4LD(2)=1000.
224
                SIGL(2)=200.
```

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Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
IF (MAXDOS + SHL VAL (12) .LE. 400.) SMLD (2) = 540.
2 2 5
5 5 9
                IF (MAXDOS + SHL VAL (12) .. E. 400.) SIGL (2) = 162.
227
                IF(MAXDOS+SHLVAL(12).GT.400..AND.MAXDOS+SHLVAL(12).LE.1300.)
                    S4LD(2)=720.
2 2 8
2 29
                IF(MAXDOS+SHLVAL(I2).GT.400..AND.MAXDOS+SHLVAL(I2).LE.1300.)
2 30
                    SIGL(2)=370.
                FAT(I1)=FAT(I1)+CUMN((MAXDOS+SHLVAL(I2)-SMLD(I1))/SIGL(I1))
231
232
               S+SHLPCT(IZ)
                CAS(11)=CAS(11)+CUMN((MAXDOS+SHLVAL(12)-SMCD(11))/SIGC(11))
2 3 3
234
               B*SHLPCT(12)
235
                IF((MAXDOS+SHLVAL(12)).EQ.O) FAT(11)=0.
                IF((4AXDOS+SHLVAL(IZ)).EQ.D) CAS(I1)=0.
236
237
           999 CONTINUE
2 38
                DO 22 I=1.3
239
                ATEM(6,1)=CAP
240
                ATEM(5,1) = (1.0-SPROBS) + CAP
241
                ATEM(1,1) = SPROBS + CAP+FAT(1)
242
                ATEM(2,1) = (SPROBS-MPROBS) + (1.0-FAT(1)) + CAP
243
                ATEM(3,1)=MPROBS+(1.0-FAT(1))+CAS(1)+CAP
                ATEM(4,1)=CAP-(ATEM(5,1)+ATEM(1,1)+ATEM(2,1)+ATEM(3,1))
244
245
                IF (ATEM(4,1).LT.J.) ATEM(4,1)=0.
246
           22
                CONTINUE
247
                IF (IFLAG.EQ.O) GO TO 4
                IF (ICTY.NE.SVCTY.OR.IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISUB.NE.SVSUB) I1=1
248
249
                IF (ICTY.NE.SVCTY.OR.IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISUB.NE.SVSUB) GO TO 7
250
                IFLAS=1
251
                DO 5 J1=1.3
252
                00 5 JZ=1,6
253
                00 5 J3=1,3
254
                ALIN(J1,J2,J3) = ALIN(J1,J2,J3) + ATEM(J2,J3)
255
           5
                CONTINUE
256
                IF (1E0F.EQ.1) GO TO 7
257
                60 TO 6
258
                ILIN=ILIN+4
259
                IF (ILIN.LE.53) GO TO B
5 90
           33
                PRINT 69
261
                FORMAT (1H1)
                PRINT 61
2 62
263
                PRINT 62,TITLE1
                PRINT 63,TITLE2,JNAM
264
2 6 5
                PRINT 64, TITLE3
266
                PRINT 65, TITLE4
                PRINT 76
267
5 68
                PRINT 68
269
                PRINT 66
2 70
                FORMAT (TZ, *** RED ON BLUE , 40x, POPULATION ASSESSMENT )
           61
271
                FORMAT (T2,"++ CASE/SCENARIO: ',A20)
                FORMAT (T2,"** SPEC INSTR: ",A20,26x,A5)
FORMAT (T2,"** SPEC INSTR: ",A20,26x,5(1H-))
272
           63
273
           64
274
                FORMAT (TZ, "++", 1X, A3, 1X, "ASSESSMENT")
275
                FORMAT (T37, FATALITIES', 36x, "INJURIES")
           68
                FORMAT( T22,43(1H-),2x,43(1H-),6x, "RESIDUAL",3x, "ASSESS",/,
276
           66
277
               $ 12x,'TOT POP',6x,2('PROMPT',8x,'FALLOUT',10x,'TOTAL',9x),
               $ 2x, POP', 7x, 'TIME', /, 12x, 7(1H-), 2x, 7(13(1H-), 2x), 6(1H-), /,
278
279
               $ 1x, 'REG', 2x, 'CTRY', 4x, 'MIL', 7x, 6('MIL', 3x, 'PCT', 6x),
280
               $ 'MIL',3x,'PCT',4x,'DAYS',/,1x,3(1H-),2x,4(1H-),3x,5(1H-),3x,
```

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Table C-1. The original SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
281
               $ 7(8(1H-),14,4(1H-),2x),6(1H-),//)
                ILIN=17
282
                DO 13 K2=1.6
283
                00 13 K3=1,3
284
                ALIN(11,K2,K3) = ALIN(11,K2,K3)/MIL
285
          13
                CONTINUE
286
                GO TO (40,41,42),I1
287
          43
                ENCODE(TOPOS, 50) SVRG, SPAC1, SVCTY
288
                FORMAT (A1,A4,A2, 1)
289
           50
                GD TO 75
2 90
                ENCODE (TOPOS,51) SVRS,SPAC2
FORMAT (A1,A3,*ALL *)
           41
291
292
           51
                GO TO 75
293
           42
                ENCODE (TOPOS,57)
2 94
           57
                FORMAT ('WW', ZX, 'ALL')
295
           75
                00 9 13=1,3
296
                TFA=ALIN(11,5,13)+ALIN(11,1,13)
297
                TINHAL (1.(11,2,13)+ALIN(11,3,13)
298
                DO 10 K=1.5
299
                PCT(K)=(ALIN(11,K,13)/ALIN(11,6,13))+100.
300
301
           10
                CONTINUE
                PCT(6) = (TFA/ALIN(11,6,13)) +100.
302
303
                PCT(7)=(TIN/ALIN(11,6,13))+100.
304
                PRINT 1, TOPOS
                                   -ALIN(11,6,13),ALIN(11,5,13),PCT(5),
               $ ALIN(11,1,13),PCT(1),TFA,PCT(6),ALIN(11,2,13),PCT(2),
305
               $ ALIN(11,3,13),PCT(3),TIN,PCT(7),ALIN(11,4,13),PCT(4),ITIME(13)
306
                FORMAT (2X,AB,
                                      1x, F8.3, 2x, 7 (F8.3, 1x, F4.1, 2x), 1x, A3)
307
                CONTINUE
308
309
                IF (I1.EQ.2) PRINT 76
                IF (I1.EQ.2) ILIN=ILIN+1
310
311
                PRINT 76
                FORMAT (/)
312
                00 11 12=1.6
313
314
                C.0=(E1,S1,11)NIJA
315
                CONTINUE
316
                IF (I1.EQ.1) SVCTY=ICTY
317
                IF (11.EQ. 3. AND. IEOF. ED. 1) GO TO 99
318
                IF (I1.EQ.2) SVRG=IRG
319
                IF (I1.EQ.2) GO TO 12
320
                IF (11.EQ.3) SVSU3=ISU3
321
                IF (11.EQ.3) ILIN=60
355
                IF (I1.EQ.3) JNAM = 'RURAL'
323
                IF (11.EQ.3) GO TO 4
324
                IF (IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISU9.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEDF.EQ.1) I1=2
3 2 5
                IF (IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISJB.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEOF.ER.1) SO TO 7
326
327
                 GO TO 4
                IF (ISUB.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEOF.EQ.1) 11=3
           12
358
                 IF (ISUB.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEOF.EQ.1) GO TO 7
329
                 GO TO 4
3 30
           QR
                 IEOF=1
3 3 1
                 I1=1
3 3 2
                 GO TO 7
3 3 3
           99
334
                 STOP
                 END
335
```

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# APPENDIX D THE MODIFIED SIDAC POST-PROCESSOR

Table D-1 presents the SIDAC post-processor as modified to handle the Attrition Rate equations. It is slightly longer than the original (361 lines to 342 lines). Other than some overall modifications and simplifications (which could be equally well applied to the original) the major changes occur in the prime computational section, lines 171 to 252, and at line 32. (Other changes, such as various initializations, will become obvious upon comparing the two sets of code).

Line 32 reads the two coefficients from the attrition rate equation,  $y = AA \times t + BB$ . On lines 171 to 252, the primary modification is the addition of two loops (line 206 and 238) indexed from 1 to N1, where N1 is the number of time periods (including the "Zeroth") until the entire population has left the shelter. All fatalities and casualties are calculated separately for each time period, and a separate SHLVAL, denoted SHVALX, is computed for each. The dose received for each group is held in STOR. FATX and CASX contain separate casualty percentages for each group. These separate figures are finally recombined in lines 254-263 by multiplying by the proportion of people in each group. The remainder of the program is identical to the orginial.

To run this program, follow the same procedure as in the original post-processor, except a card giving the values of AA and BB must be included to be read at line 32.

Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor.

```
DIMENSION IPRUF(2,5,7),1SHPCT(5,7),1MULT(2,5),1SHLV(7),
             RISHLP(7), DR 1(2), 1TX(4), 1PCTF(5)
              DIMENSION XMULT(2,5)
              CHARACTER ICC+2(5)
              CHARACTER TITLE1 * 2U , TITLE2 * 20 , TITLE3 * 20 , TITLE4 * 3
              CHARACTER UNAMI*5, TOPUS*U, SPAC1*4, SPAC2*3
              CHARACTER ISUB *1.5V508*1
              DIMENSION ALIN(3,6,3),PCT(7),ATEM(6,3),IFAT(3),ICAS(3),FAT(3),
b
 9
             3 CAS(3) COM(30)
              CHARACTER IRU*1 .SVRG*1,ITIME*5(3),INAP+5(2),IC4T*1
CHARACTER ICTY*2/1 1/,SVCTY*2/1 1/
1 ù
11
12
              DATA ITX /24,72,245,720/
              DATA ITIME/ 7 7 .. 0 . 1001/
13
              DIMENSION SHLVAL(16), SHLPCT(16), SHLD(3), SHCD(3), SIGL(3), SIGC(3)
14
              LATA SMLD/1000.0.,450./
15
              DATA SHCU/200.,215.,400./
              DATA SIGL/200..1..155./
              DATA SIGC/50.,04.5,120./
13
10
              UATA SHLIALI.U1,.075,.15,.2,.5,.5,.7,
             $.1,.15,.2,.25,.3,.4,.55,.6,.7/
20
              CAT4 SHLPCT/.US..12..045..365..09..21..1.
21
             8.007,.u035,.036,.01C5,.055,.U75,.253,.25,.3/
2.5
23
              DIMENSION XSHLV(8) . KSHLP(400)
              CHARACTER KCTY+2(50)
24
              DATA XSHEV/200..100..50..20..10..5..3..1.4/
25
              20
              REAL MPHJUS
27
              IPAC=0
29
              REWING 25
              REWIND 1J
30
              DIMENSION SHVALX(16,50), FATA(3,50), CASX(3,50)
31
32
               READ(47,776) 44,68
        775
               FORMAT(2F10.5)
33
              1 = 1
35
              KCTY(I)="
         1011 READ(10,1012,EN0=1013)KCTY(I),(KSHLP(6*(I-1)+J),J=1,8)
36
37
         1012 FURMAT (A2,012)
              I = I + 1
30
              GO TO 1611
39
40
         1013 CONTINUE
41
              READ (5,100) TITLE1,TITLE2,TITLE3,TITLE4
         100 FURNAT (3A2U/A3)
4)
43
              READ (5,449,640=2121) ITT,JTT
44
         449 FORMAT (14,14)
              IF(JTT.E4.0)JTT=504
45
40
              IF(JTT.GE.ITT)GO TO 3151
47
              KTT=JTT
              JTT=ITT
48
              ITT=KTT
49
50
         3131 CONTINUE
51
              DO 46 J=1,5
              READ (5,30,END=40)
                                      ICC(J), INULT(1,J), IMULT(2,J),
                                  (IPHUF(1,J,K),K=1,7),(IPHUF(2,J,K),K=1,7),
53
             &(ISHPCT(Jak)ak=1a7)a[PCTF(J)
54
             FORMAT (
                         A2,213,1413,712,11)
55
         30
              CONTINUE
56
         46
```

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Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
57
            2121
                    CONTINUE
 58
                  HI=GUZI
 59
                 SVSUE=1H
 60
                 MIL=100C000.
 61
                 JNAM= "URBAN"
 62
                 SPAC1=4H
 63
                 SPAC2=3H
                 SVCTY=2H
 64
 65
                 SVRG=1H
 66
                 TOPOS=8H
 67
                 I E O F = 0
 68
                 ILIN=6U
 69
                 IFLAG=0
 70
                 DO 21 11=1,3
                 DG 21 I2=1,6
DO 21 I3=1,3
 71
 72
 73
                 .0=(11,12,13)=0.
 74
                 ATEM(12,13)=0.
 75
           21
                 CONTINUE
 76
                 READ (25, END=98) COM
 77
                 MPROUS=COM(4)
 78
                 SPROBS=COM(5)
 79
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 103, ICAP, 1,0)
 80
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 133, 12G, 1, 1)
 81
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 101, ICTY, 1, 2)
 82
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 189, ISUB, 1, 1)
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 171, IFAT (1),5,2)
 83
 84
                 CALL BYTE(CON, 175, 1FAT(2), 5, 2)
 85
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 179, 1FAT(3), 5,2)
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 169, ICAS (1),5,2)
 87
                 CALL BYTE(CON, 173, ICAS(2), 5, 2)
 85
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 177, 1CAS(3), 5,2)
 89
                 CALL HYTE (COM, 184, ICAT, 1,5)
 90
                 CALL BYTE(COM, U45, NAXUOS, 1,6)
                 CALL BYTE (CUM, 037, I DNDOS, 1,6)
 92
                 CALL SYTE (CON, 193, ISHLV (1),4,3)
 93
                 CALL EYTE (COH, 196, ISHLV (2), 4,3)
 94
                 CALL BYTE (CUM, 199, ISHLV (3),4,3)
 95
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 202, ISHLV(4),4,3)
 96
                 CALL HYTE(COM, 205, ISHLV(5),4,3)
 97
                 CALL BYTE (CON, 208, ISHLV (6),4,3)
                 CALL BYTE(COM.223,15HLV(7),4,3)
 28
 99
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 191, ISHLP(1), 5,2)
100
                 (S.Z.(S) THEI, ITS, NO) 3TYE LIAD
101
                 CALL BYTE (COM, 213, ISHLP (3),5,2)
102
                 CALL BYTE(COM, 215, ISHLP(4),5,2)
103
                 CALL BYTE (COM. 217, ISHLP (5),5,2)
104
                 CALL BYTE (CUM, 219, ISHLP (6), 5, 2)
                 CALL SYTE(COM, 221, ISHLP(7),5,2)
105
106
                 IF(ICAT.EQ."75099".OR.ICAT.E4."750990")40 TU 251
107
                 ISHLV(1)=800
108
                 ISHLV(2)=250
109
                 ISHLV(3)=15)
                 ISHLV(4)=10U
110
111
                 ISHLV(5)=40
112
                 ISHLV(6)=20
```

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Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
113
                 ISHLV(7)=10
114
                 ISHLP(1)=14
115
                 ISHLP(2)=7
116
                 ISHLP(3)=7
117
                 ISHLP (4) = 14
118
                ISHLP(5)=28
119
                ISHLP(6)=17
120
                ISHLP(7)=13
121
                GO TO 252
           251
122
                ISHLV(1)=40
123
                ISHLV(2)=35
124
                ISHLV(3)=30
125
                ISHLV(4)=25
126
                ISHLV(5)=20
127
                ISHLV(6)=15
128
                ISHLV(7)=10
129
                ISHLP(1)=2
130
                ISHLP(2)=5
131
                ISHLP(3)=15
132
                ISHLP(4)=8
133
                ISHLP(5)=22
134
                ISHLP(6)=6
135
                ISHLP(7)=42
136
           252 CONTINUE
137
                If(ICTY.EQ."US")60 TO 1017
138
                00 1014 JJ=1,50
139
                IF(KCTY(JJ) .EQ." ")60 TO 1017
140
           1014 IF(ICTY.EQ.KCTY(JJ))GO TO 1015
141
           1015 DO 1016 KK=1.7
142
                ISHLV(KK)=XSHLV(KK)
143
           1016 ISHLP(KK)=KSHLP((JJ-1)+8+KK)
144
           1017 CONTINUE
145
                IF (IFLAG.EG.1) GO TO 52
146
                SVCTY=ICTY
147
                SVRG=IRG
148
                SVSUB=ISUB
149
          52
                CONTINUE
150
                CAP=FLOAT(ICAP)
151
                IF(ICAT.EQ."75100".OR.ICAT.EQ."751000")CAP=CAP+1000.
152
                IFCICAT.EQ."75099".OR.ICAT.EQ."750990")CAP=CAP+100.
153
          23
                CONTINUE
154
                INT=1
155
                INF=7
156
                IF (IPAC.EU.5) INT=0
157
                IF (IPAC.Eu.S) Infalo
158
                00 191 15=1,3
159
                CAS(13)=).
160
                FAT(13)=U.
161
          191
               CONTINUE
162
                f = 1 1
163
          44
                IF(II.E0.6) GO TO 261
                IF(100(11).E4.ICTY.GH.100(11).E4."xx")
104
                                                             60 TO 140
165
                11=11+1
166
                00 TU 44
167
          201
               PRINT 202
168
          202 FORMAT (15x,/////, *CARU XX HISSING*)
```

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Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
169
                CALL EXIT
                00 143 LL=1,7
170
          146
171
          143
                SHLPCT(LL)=FLOAT(ISHLP(LL))/100.
172
         C *** THE CALCULATION USES ONLY THE PCT DIST.IN THE DATA RECORD. HOWEVER
173
         C *** ISHPCT HAS BEEN READ IN AND PGM CAN BE MODIFIED
174
         C *** IT IS ASSUMED THAT THERE WILL BE ONLY ONE PCT DIST. FOR BOTH
         C *** (POSSIBLE) SETS OF PROTECTION FACTORS(IPROF).
175
176
         C *** THE FORM OF THE CALCULATION ASSUMED FOR THE SECOND TIME PERIOD
         C *** IS IST MULT*(1./1ST PROT. FACT.) + 2ND MULT*(1./2ND P.F.).
177
178
         C *** ALSO IT IS ASSUMED THAT 1ST PERIOD USES THE PROT. FACT. IN THE
179
         C *** UATA BASE RECORD.
180
         C ***
181
         C *** IPCTF IS THE FLAG TO USE NEW PCT DIST. OR NOT.
182
                IF(IPCTF(II).Ew.G) GO TO 144
183
                DU 145 LL=1,7
184
          145
                SHLPCT(LL)=FLOAT(ISHPCT(II,LL))/100.
185
          144
                IF(II.LT.6) GO TO 147
186
                DO 148 JJ=1,7
187
          148
                SHLVAL(JJ)=FLOAT(ISHLV(JJ))/100.
                GO TU 991
00 149 K=1.7
188
          147
189
190
                PR1=FLOAT([PR0F(1,II,K))
                PR2=FLOAT(IPROF(2,II,K))
191
192
                IF(IPROF(1,II,K).LE.O) FR1=FLOAT(ISHLV(K))
193
                IF(IPROF(2,II,K).LE.U)PK2=1.53846
194
         C *** IF THE PROTECTION FACTOR IN THE DATA GASE RECURD AND THEPROT.
195
         C *** FACT. IN THE CHANGE CARU ARE BOTH U. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE
         C *** PROT. FACT. = 1./.65
196
197
                XMULT(1,II)=FLOAT(IMULT(1,II))/10U.
198
                XMULT(2,11)=FLOAT(IMULT(2,11))/100.
199
                If(IMULT(1,11).Eq.G.AND.INULT(2,11).Eq.G) XMULT(1,11)=1.0
                IF((ICTY.EQ."JA".OR.ICTY.EG."TW").AND.K.EQ.1)Pk1#1.4
IF(ICTY.EQ."TW".AND.K.EQ.1)SHLPCT(1)#.3
230
201
                IF(ICTY.EG."JA".AND.K.EG.1)SHLPCT(1)=.4
202
203
                 ITT=-24
204
                       ((1.0 -63)/(AA+24.))+2
                 N1=
205
                 00 153 NA=1/N1
206
                00 154 11=1.3
                FATX(I1,NA)=0.
207
         154
208
                 CASX(I1.NA)=0.
209
                 ITT=ITT+24
210
                IF(ITT.EW.U) 40 TO 152
211
                IF(ITT.GE.504)60 TO 151
212
                DRM(1)=1-ITT++(-.2)
213
                DRM(2) = ITT + + (-.2) - JT (++(-.2)
214
                GO TO 150
                URM(1)=1.-ITT**(-.2)
215
         151
216
                DRM(2)=0.
217
                GO TO 153
218
         152
                 ORM(1)=1.
219
                 DRM(2) =- JT [ ** ( - . 2 )
220
         150
                CONTINUE
221
                FAC1=DRM(1)*(1./PR1)
                FAC2=XMULT(1,11) + (1./Pk1)
222
                FAC3=XMULT(2,11)+(1./PR2)
223
224
                FAC4=DRM(2)
                                      *(FACZ+FAC3)
```

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Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
225
                 FAC5=DRM(1)+DRM(2)
559
                 FACO=FAC1+FAC4
227
                 SHLVAL(K)=FAC6/FAC5
855
                  SHVALX(K,NA)=SHLVAL(K)
229
          9563
                   FORMAT(1x,110,6F10.4)
 230
          153
                 CONTINUE
 231
           149
                 CONTINUE
232
           991
                 CONTINUE
233
                 INT=1
234
                 INF=7
                 00 999 I1=1,3
235
                 00 999 12=INT, INF
236
237
                 DC 999 NA=1,N1
238
                  SMLD(2)=1000.
239
                  SIGL(2)=200.
240
                  STOR=MAXDOS+SHVALX(I2,NA)
241
                  IF(STOR.LE.400.) SMLD(2)=540.
242
                  IF(STOR.LE.400.)SIGL(2)=162.
243
                  IF(STOR.GT.400..AND.STOR.LE.1300.) SMLD(2)=720.
244
                  IF(STOR.GT.400..AND.STOR.LE.1300.)SIGL(2)=370.
245
                 FATX(I1,NA) = FATX(I1,NA) + CUMN((STOR-SMLD(I1))/SIGL(I1)) * SHLPCT(I2)
246
                 CASX(I1,NA)=CASX(I1,NA)+CUMN((STOR-SMCD(I1))/SIGC(I1))+SHLPCT(I2)
247
                 IF(STOR.GT.1000.) JJJCN=JJJCN+1
248
                 IF(STOR.NE.O)GO TO 999
249
                 FATX(I1,NA)=0.
250
                 CASX(I1,NA)=0.
251
           999
                CONTINUE
252
                IIN1= N1-2
253
                 00 157 11=1,3
254
                 CAS(I1)=B3+CASX(I1,1)+(1.0 -(IIN1+AA+24.) -BD
                                                                       ) *CASX(I1,N1)
255
                 FAT([1] =BB+FATX([1],1)+(1.0 -([IN1*AA*24.) -BB
                                                                       ) * FATX([1,N1)
256
                 TEMP1=0.
257
                 TEMP2=0.
258
                 DO 156 NE=2,N1-1
259
                 TEMP1=TEMP1+FATX(I1,NB)
260
         156
                 TEMP2=TEMP2+CASX(I1.NB)
261
                 FAT(11)=FAT(11)+(24.*AA+TEMP1)
262
         157
                 CAS(11) #CAS(11) + (24. *AA*TEMP2)
263
                00 22 I=1,3
264
                ATEM(6, I-) = CAP
265
                ATEM(5,1)=(1.0-SPROBS)+CAP
266
                ATEM(1,1) = SPROBS + CAP + FAT(1)
267
                ATEM(2,1)=(SPROBS-NPROBS)+(1.U-FAT(1))+CAP
268
                ATEM(5,1) =MPRJGS+(1.G-FAT(1)) +CAS(1)+CAP
267
                ATEM(4,1) =CAP-(ATEM(5,1)+ATEM(1,1)+ATEM(2,1)+ATEM(3,1))
270
                IF (ATEM(4,1).LT.O.) ATEM(4,1)=0.
271
          22
                CONTINUE
272
                IF (IFLAG.EQ.O) GO TO 4
273
                IF (ICTY.NE.SVCIY.OR.IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISUD.NE.SVSUB) I1=1
274
                IF (ICTY-NE-SVCTY-CR-IRG-ME-SVRG-OR-ISUD-ME-SVSUB) GO TO 7
275
                IFLAG=1
276
                00 5 J1=1,3
277
                60 5 J2=1,5
                UU 5 J3=1,5
278
279
                ALIA(11,12,13) = ALIN(11,12,13) + ATEM(12,13)
280
                CONTINUE
```

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Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
IF (IEUF.Eu.1) 30 TO 7
281
282
                  GC TO 6
                  ILIN=ILIN+4
283
284
                  IF (ILIN.LE.53) GO TO &
285
            33
                  PRINT 69
                 FORMAT (1H1)
286
            69
287
                  PRINT 61
                  PRINT 62, TITLE1
288
289
                  PRINT 63, TITLEZ, JNAM
290
                  FRINT 64, TITLES
291
                  PRINT 65, TITLE4
292
                  PRINT 76
293
                  PRINT 68
294
                  PRINT 66
295
                  FORMAT (T2," ** RED ON BLUE", 40x, PCPULATION ASSESSMENT")
                  FORMAT (T2, *** CASE/SCENARIO: *, A20)
FORMAT (T2, *** SPEC INSTR: *, A20, 26x, A5)
296
            62
297
            63
                  FORMAT (T2, ** SPEC INSTR: 1, A2U, 20x, 5(1H-))
298
            64
                  FORMAT (T2,'**',1x,A3,1x,'ASSESSMENT')
FORMAT (T37,'FATALITIES',36x,'INJURIES')
299
            65
300
            68
301
                  FORMAT( T22,43(1H-),2x,43(1H-),6x, RESIDUAL 1,3x, ASSESS 1,/,
302
                & 12x, 'TGT POP', 6x, 2('PROMPT', 8x, 'FALLOUT', 1ux, 'TOTAL', 9x),
                & ZX, 'POP', 7X, 'TIME', /, 12x, 7(1H-), 2X, 7(15(1H-), 2X), 6(1H-), /, 8 1x, 'REG', 2x, 'CTRY', 4x, 'MIL', 7x, 6('MIL', 3x, 'PCT', 6X),
303
304
305
                  "MIL",3X,"PCT",4X,"DAYS",/,1X,3(1H-),2X,4(1H-),3X,5(1H-),3X,
                & 7(8(1H-),1x,4(1H-),2x),6(1H-),//)
306
307
                  ILIN=17
                  DO 13 K2=1,6
308
309
                  DO 13 K3=1,3
310
                  ALIN(11,K2,K3) = ALIN(11,K2,K3)/MIL
311
            13
                  CONTINUE
312
                  GO TO (40,41,42),11
313
            40
                  ENCODE (TOPOS, 50) SVRG, SPAC1, SVCTY
314
            50
                  FORMAT (A1,A4,A2,1 1)
315
                  GO TO 75
                  ENCODE (TOPOS,51) SVRG,SPAC2
FORMAT (A1,A3,'ALL ')
316
317
            51
318
                  GO TO 75
319
                  ENCODE (TOPOS, 57)
                  FORMAT ('WW',2X,'ALL')
320
            57
            75
                  DO 9 13=1,3
321
322
                  TFA=ALIN(11,5,13)+ALIN(11,1,13)
323
                  TIN=ALIN(11,2,13)+ALIN(11,3,13)
324
                  DO 10 K=1.5
                  PCT(K)=(ALIN(11,K,13)/ALIN(11,6,13))+100.
325
326
            10
                  CONTINUE
327
                  PCT(a) = (TFA/ALIN(11,6,13)) +100.
328
                  PCT(7)=(TIN/ALIN(I1,6,13)) +100.
329
                  PRINT 1, TOPOS
                                        -ALIN(11-0-13)-ALIN(11-5-13)-PCT(5)-
330
                 & ALIN(11,1,13), PCT(1), TFA, PCT(6), ALIN(11,2,13), PCT(2),
331
                 & ALIN(11,3,13),PCT(3),T1N,PCT(7),ALIN(11,4,13),PCT(4),IT1ME(13)
                  FORMAT (2X,A8,
332
                                         1x, f8, 3, 2x, 7 (f8, 3, 1x, f4, 1, 2x), 1x, A3)
333
                  CONTINUE
334
                  IF (I1.EQ.2) PRINT 76
                  IF (I1.EQ.2) ILIN=ILIN+1
335
                  PRINT 76
```

Table D-1. The modified SIDAC post-processor (continued).

```
337
                FORMAT (/)
                UO 11 I2=1,6
338
                uo 11 I3=1,3
339
340
                0.0=(CI.SI.TI) ALIA
341
           11
                CONTINUE
                IF (I1.E4.1) SVCTY=ICTY
342
                IF (I1.EQ.3.AND.IEOF.EQ.1) GO TO 99
343
                IF (I1.E4.2) SVRG=IRG
344
                IF (11.EQ.2) GO TO 12
345
346
347
                IF (I1.EQ.3) SVSUB=ISUB
IF (I1.EQ.3) ILIN=60
                IF (I1.EQ.3) JNAM = 'KURAL'
348
349
                IF (I1.64.3) GO TO 4
                IF (IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISUB.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEOF.EG.1) I1=2
350
351
                IF (IRG.NE.SVRG.OR.ISUB.NE.SVSUB.OR.IEOF.EQ.1) GO TO 7
352
                GU TO 4
                IF (ISUB.ME.SVSUB.OR.IEUF.EG.1) I1=3
353
           12
354
                IF (ISUL.NE.SVSUB.UR.IECF.EG.1) GO TU 7
355
                GU TO 4
356
           48
                IEOF=1
                I1=1
357
358
                GO TO 7
359
           99
                STOP
                END
300
```

このことのでは、男人教をあります。 ときしゃ

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# APPENDIX E SIDAC POST-PROCESSOR RESULTS

Tables E-1 to E-9 present the complete results of casualty calculations for nine different stay time assumptions. The first seven are traditional stay times, ranging from 3/4 day fully sheltered, 20 1/4 day partially sheltered, to 21 days fully sheltered. The last two are the Best and Worst Cases from the Attrition Rate Model.

The column headings one for the most part self-explanatory. All population figures are in millions. The three assessment times per table are 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days, as indicated in the last column. For each table, the upper chart refers to the urban population; the lower, to the rural population.

Table E-1. SIDAC post-processor results - 3/4 day sheltered, 20 1/4 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS TIME DAYS 7 30 180		ASSESS TIME DAYS 7 30 180
		MIL PCT 11.600 8.8 11.751 8.9 12.888 9.8		RESIDUAL POP MIL PCI 48.305 58.1 48.903 58.8 53.466 64.3
		TOTAL MIL PCT 25.979 19.8 23.732 18.1 20.291 15.4		MIL PCT 24.096 29.0 20.365 24.5 12.394 14.9
	INJURIES	FALLOUT HIL PCT 2.999 2.3 2.270 1.7 0.518 0.4	INJURIES	FALLOUT MIL PCT 112.378 14.9 2 2.253 2.7
URBAN		MIL PCT 22.980 17.5 21.462 16.3 19.773 15.0	RURAL.	MIL PCT 11.718 14.1 10.969 13.2
<b>5</b> 1	•	TOTAL MIL PCT 93.854 71.4 95.949 73.0 98.254 74.8	<b>62</b> 1	TOTAL MIL PCT 10.752 12.9 13.885 16.7 17.294 20.8
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT MIL PCT 1,723 1.3 3,818 2.9 6,123 4.7		FALLOUT  MIL PCT  0 3.260 3.9 0 6.392 7.7 0 9.801 11.8
		PROMPT MIL PCT 92.131 70.1 92.131 70.1		PROMPT PCT 7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0
		HIL 131.433 131.433		MIL 83.153 83.153 83.153
		US US		CTRY US US

Table E-2. SIDAC post-processor results - 2 days sheltered, 19 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS	DAYS	30	180			ASSESS	DAYS	7	88
		RESIDUAL POP	5	9.5	10.2			RESIDUAL POP	Ы	61.1	61.7 66.5
		RESI	Ⅱ	12.509	13.458			RESI	텙	50.821	51.331 55.321
		TOTAL	5	19.7	9.91			TOTAL	<u>[</u>	27.3	23.6 15.3
		일	崩	25.833 24.258	21.811			유  	로	22.714	19.587 12.745
	INJURIES	FALLOUT	됩	1.8	0.4		INJURIES	FALLOUT	P.	12.9	9.8 5.5
	UCNI	F	뒱	2.322	. 502		UCNI	FAL	됩	10.738	8.23 <b>4</b> 2.081
	Ī	PROMPT	5	17.9	16.2			PROMPT	72	14.4	13.7
BAN	URBAN	€	탈	23.510	21.309	RURAL		<b>E</b> !	Ħ	11.976	11.352
<b>%</b>		4	51	70.8	73.2	副		   	Ы	11.6	14.7 18.1
		TOTAL	됩	93.091	96.164			TOTAL	됩	9.618	12.236 15.080
	ries	FALLOUT	되	0.7	3.1		ries	FALLOUT	51	5.6	9.1
	FATALITIES	FALI	됩	0.960			FATALITIES	FALI	崩	2,125	4.743
		PROMPT	Ы	70.1	70.1			PROMPT	PCT		9.0 0.0
		8	턽	92.131	92.131			æ.	<b>Ħ</b>	7.493	7.493
		T01 P0P	딅	131.433	131,433			TOT POP	를	83.153	83.153 83.153
			CTRY	S S	S				CTRY	SN	รร

Table E-3. SIDAC post-processor results - 3 days sheltered, 18 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS	DAYS	30	180			ASSESS	DAYS	7 30 180
		RESTDUAL POP	15	15 9.8 00 9.8				RESTOUAL POP	L PCT	12 62.2 85 62.8 56 67.3
		æ 1	₹	12.815	13.6			ا <u>ت</u> ق	HI.	51.712 52.185 55.956
		TOTAL	<u>7</u>	25.737 19.6 24.408 18.6	2 17.0			TOTAL	5	
		۲۱	HI.	25.73	22.31			=1	¥I.	22.15 19.26 12.86
	INJURIES	FALLOUT	<u>5</u>	1.6	0.4		NJURIES	FALLOUT	PC	12.2 9.4 2.4
	UCNI	FAL	Ħ	2.078	0.493		INJ	FA	MI	21.13
		PROMPT	5	18.0				PROMPT	PCT	14.5 13.8 13.0
URBAN		8	품	23.659	21.819	RURAL		<u>ڇ</u> ا	HIL	12.047 11.474 10.846
51		TOTAL	25	70.7	72.6	ēc;		TOTAL	PCT	11.2
		101	불	92.881	95.455			[ [2]	MIL	9.289 11.707 14.329
	1ES	FALL OUT	PCT	9.6			TIES	FALLOUT	РСТ	2.2 5.1 8.2
	FATALITIES	LALI	MIL	0.750	3, 324		FATALITIES	FAL	MIL	1.796 4.214 6.836
		PROMPT	5	70.1	20.1			PROMPT	PCT	
		PR	Ħ.	92.131	92.131			ag l	MIL	7.493 7.493 7.493
		TOT POP	MIL	131.433	131.433			TOT POP	MIL	83.153 83.153 83.153
			CTRY	SUS	32				CTRY	888

US US


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Table E-4. SIDAC post-processor results - 5 days sheltered, 16 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS	DAYS	7 30 180			ASSESS TIME	DAYS	7 30 180
		RESIDUAL POP	MJL PCT	13.197 10.0 13.260 10.1 13.923 10.6			RESIDUAL POP	MIL PCT	52.804 63.5 53.226 64.0 56.699 68.2
		TOTAL	MIL PCT	25.572 19.5 24.521 18.7 22.812 17.4			TOTAL	MIL PCT	21.410 25.7 18.822 22.6 13.018 15.7
	INJURIES	FALLOUT	PCT	3 1.3 6 1.1 4 0.3		INJURIES	FALLOUT	5	11 11.2 0 8.7 7 2.4
	N.		PCT MIL	18.1 1.763 17.6 1.416 17.0 0.454		NI	i	PCT MIL	14.6 9.291 14.0 7.210 13.3 1.957
AN		PROMPT	H H	23.809 1 23.105 1 22.358 1	정		PROMPT	#	12.119 11.612 11.061
URBAN	1	TOTAL	PCT	70.5 71.3 72.1	RURAL	,	TOTAL	51	10.8
		21	MIL	92.664 93.653 94.698			) P1	뒾	8.939 11.105 13.436
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	0.533 0.4 1.522 1.2 2.567 2.0		FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	3.613 4.3 5.944 7.1
	FAT	PROMPT	51	70.1 0. 70.1 1. 70.1 2.		FA	PROMPT	F	0.6
		&	뒫	92.131 92.131 92.131			<u>&amp;</u>	¥ (	7.493 7.493 7.493
		TOT POP	MIL	131,433 131,433 131,433			TOT POP	딡	83,153 83,153 83,153
			CTRY	ss su				CTRY	ss ss

Table E-5. SIDAC post-processor results - 7 days sheltered, 14 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS TIME	DAYS	`& <u>&amp;</u>				ASSESS	DAYS	7 30 180
		RESIDUAL POP	MIL PCT	13.501 10.3				RESIDUAL POP	MIL PCT	53.503 64.3 53.887 64.8 57.160 68.7
		TOTAL	MIL PCT	24.537 18.7				TOTAL	MIL PCT	20.906 25.1 18.521 22.3 13.109 15.8
	INJURIES	FALLOUT		1.251 1.0			INJURIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	8.748 10.5 6.827 8.2 1.916 2.3
URBAN		PROMPT		23.286 17.7		RURAL		PROMPT	M1L PCT	12.157 14.6 11.694 14.1 11.192 13.5
<b>5</b> 1		TOTAL		92.556 70.4 93.396 71.1		쫎		TOTAL	MIL PCT	8.745 10.5 10.746 12.9 12.885 15.5
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	0.425 0.3 1.265 1.0	7.140		FATALILLES	FALLOUT	M1L PCT	3.252 1.5 3.253 3.9 5.392 6.5
		PROMPT	1	92.131 70.1 92.131 70.1				PROMPT	MIL PCT	7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0
		TOT POP	<del> </del>	131.433	131.*33			10T P0P	Mil	83.153 83.153 83.153
			CTRY	SSS	Sn				CTRY	SE SE






Table E-6. SIDAC post-processor results - 14 days sheltered, 7 days 2/3 sheltered.

		ASSESS	DAYS	30 ~	180			ASSESS	DAYS	7 08 180
		절시	Ы	10.6 10.6	10.9			J S S S	5	66.0 66.4 69.8
		RESTOUAL POP	텙	13.940	14.342			RESIDUAL POP	럹	54.879 55.177 58.040
	ı	TOTAL	5	19.1	17.9			TOTAL	ы	23.9 21.5 15.9
		위	뒢	25.086 24.496	23.486			21	표	19.854 17.885 13.252
	RIES	FALLOUT	12	0.8	0.3		INJURIES	FALLOUT	Ы	9.2 2.2
	INJURIES	룂	딞	1.100	0.355		INJ	FAL	텙	7.636 6.045 1.821
		PROMPT	5	18.2	17.6			PROMP T	밁	14.7
URBAN		2	뒫	23.986 23.567	23.131	RURAL		A.	턽	12.219 11.840 11.431
뜅		=1	5	70.3 70.8	71.2	2	!		되	10.1 12.1 14.3
		TOTAL	띭	92.407	93.606			TOTAL	뵱	8.420 10.091 11.861
	SES	E I	5	0.2	=		IES	TU0.	5	1.1 3.1 5.3
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	H.	0.276	1.475		FATALITIES	FALLOUT	H.	0.927 2.598 4.368
		PROMPT	12	70.1	70.1			PROMPT	2	9.9.9
		ă l	팋	92.131	92.131			PR	를	7.493 7.493 7.493
		TOT POP	늹	131.433	131,433			TOT POP	MIL	83, 153 83, 153 83, 153
			CTRY	S S	S				CTRY	รรร

Table E-7. SIDAC post-processor results - 21 days sheltered.

		ASSESS	DAYS	30 7	180			ASSESS	DAYS	7 02	8 8
		RESTOUAL POP	PCT	10.8 10.8	11.0			RESTOUAL POP	P.	6.6	70.4
		KES!	뒢	14.157	14.459			RESI	<b>H</b>	55.643	58.509
		TOTAL	5	19.0 18.6	18.0		,	TOTAL	5	23.1	16.0
		₽ I	MIL	24.924	23.629			2	HI!	19.241	13.301
	RIES	FALLOUT	12	0.7	0.5		INJURIES	FALLOUT	12	8.4	2.1
	INJURIES	FAL	Ħ	0.900	0.313		INJU	FAL	MIL	6.994	1.752
		PROMPT	51	18.3 18.0				PR0MPT	12		13.9
URBAN	i	ă.	#	24.024 23.677	23.316	RURAL	,	8	#	12.247	11.550
<b>%</b>		<b> </b>	12	70.3	71.0	2		 	51	9.6	13.6
		TOTAL	텙	92.352	93.344			TOTAL	呈	8.270	11.343
	TES	.00T	7	0.5	6.0		ries	FALLOUT	5	6.0	4.6
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	崩	0.221	1.213		FATALITIES	FALI	¥	0.777	3.851
		PROMPT	51	70.7	70.1			PROMPT	5	9.0	9.0
		e de l	뒱	92.131	92.131			<b>8</b>	116	7.493	7.493
		T0T P0P	HIL	131.433	131.433			T01 P0P	딅	83.153	83.153
			CTRY	SS	S				CTRY	S	SS

Table E-8. SIDAC post-processor results - attrition rate model - best case.

		ASSESS	DAYS	<b>~</b> ;	2 S			ASSESS TIME	DAYS	30 7
		P P	51		 2			S1DUAL POP	PCT	63.1 63.3 67.0
		RESIDUAL POP	MI	13.006	13.548			RESTOUAL POP	MIL	52.459 52.648 55.719
		TOTAL	<u>5</u>	19.3	7.1			TOTAL	PCT	25.6 22.8 16.3
		21	崩	25, 333	22.516			2	MIL	21.316 18.946 13.528
	INJURIES	FALLOUT	닯	4.	0.5		INJURIES	FALLOUT	PCT	9.0
	CNI	<b>E</b> I	Ħ	1.833	0.645		CNI	¥.	MIL	9.312 7.443 2.572
		PROMPT	PC1	17.9	16.6			PROMPT	PCT	14.4 13.8
SBAN	URBAN	<u>g</u>	Ħ	23.500	21.872	RURAL		2	MIL	12.004 11.503 10.956
51		TOTAL	2	70.8	72.6	교		TOTAL	PCT	11.3
		101	₫	93.093	94. 190 95. 369			01	MIL	9.379 11.559 13.906
	IES	<u>19</u>	<u>ا</u> چ	0.7	2.5		IES	100.	PCT	2.3
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	崩	0.962	3.238		FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL	1.886 4.067 6.414
		PROMP T	7	70.1				PROMPT	ž	9.0 9.0 9.0
			H	92.131	92.131			PRG	HI.	7.493
		T0T P0P	H	131.433	131.433			TOT POP	MIL	83.153 83.153 83.153
			CTRY	S	ខន				CTRY	ឧឧឧ

Table E-9. SIDAC post-processor results - attrition rate model - worst case.

		ASSESS TIME	DAYS	7 081			ASSESS TIME	UAYS	~ 8.8	
		RESIDUAL POP	MIL PCT	12.267 9.3 12.287 9.3 13.046 9.9			RESIDUAL POP	NIL PCT	50.360 60.6 50.621 60.9 54.154 65.1	
		TOTAL	MIL PCT	25.532 19.4 23.991 18.3 21.580 16.4			TOTAL	MIL PCT	22.630 27.2 19.738 23.7 13.349 16.1	
	INJURIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	2.415 1.8 1.961 1.5 0.735 0.6		INJURIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	10.799 13.0 8.517 10.2 2.799 3.4	
URBAN		PROMPT	MIL PCT	23.117 17.6 22.031 16.8 20.845 15.9	PHZA		PROMPT	MIL PCT	11.831 14.2 11.220 13.5 10.551 12.7	
<b>)</b>		TOTAL	MIL PCT	93.634 71.2 95.155 72.4 96.807 73.7	<b>6</b> .	:1	TOTAL	MIL PCT	10. 164 12.2 12. 794 15.4 15. 650 18.8	
	FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	1.503 1.1 3.024 2.3 4.676 3.6		FATALITIES	FALLOUT	MIL PCT	2.671 3.2 5.302 6.4 8.158 9.8	
		PROMPT	MIL PCT	92.131 70.1 92.131 70.1 92.131 70.1			PROMPT	MIL PCT	7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0 7.493 9.0	
		TOT POP	H I	131.433 131.433 131.433			TOT FOP	HIL	83.153 83.153 83.153	
			CTRY	និនិនិ				CIRY	ននន	

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